Privacy preference mechanisms in Personal Data Storage (PDS). by Singh, Bikash Chandra
UNIVERSITA` DEGLI STUDI DELL’INSUBRIA - VARESE
DiSTA
Dipartimento di Scienze Teoriche e Applicate
P H D T H E S I S
to obtain the title of
Doctor of Science
Specialty : Computer Science
Defended by
Bikash Chandra Singh
PRIVACY PREFERENCE
MECHANISMS IN PERSONAL
DATA STORAGE (PDS)
Advisor: Prof. Barbara Carminati
Advisor: Prof. Elena Ferrari
defended on October 05, 2018
Jury :
Reviewers : Prof. Athena Vakali, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece
Prof. Georgia M. Kapitsaki, University of Cyprus, Cyprus
President : Prof. Elena Ferrari, Universita` degli Studi Dell’Insubria, Italy
Examinators : Prof. Pierluigi Gallo, Universita` degli Studi di Palermo, Italy
Prof. Claudio Agostino Ardagna, Universita’ degli Studi di Milano, Italy
Dedication.....
To my mother Nioti Rani Singh
To my father Haresh Chandra Singh
To my wife Supreya Singh Roy
To my sister Lucky Rani Singh
To my brother Ripon Kumar Singh
Acknowledgments
I would like to utilize this opportunity for expressing my gratitude to all who supported
me to achieve this goal.
First of all, I would like to thank the Almighty God for blessing me to accomplish this
thesis. Without His blessing, I could not able to continue this work.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisors Prof. Elena Ferrari and
Prof. Barbara Carminati for their continuous support, guidance, effort, and engagement
throughout this research over the years which gave me enormous strength to pursue this
thesis successfully. Specially, their patience, motivation, immense knowledge, and enthusi-
asm greatly enriched my research work. This thesis would not have been possible without
the support of my advisors. I feel honor being one of their PhD students.
I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee members: Prof. Athena Vakali, De-
partment of Computer Science, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and Prof. Georgia M.
Kapitsaki, Department of Computer Science, the University of Cyprus for their enlighten-
ing comments and encouragement that inspire me to thought on different aspects of the
work presented in this thesis.
Next thanks go to my lab partners Go¨khan Sag˘ırlar, Pietro Colombo, Davide Albertini,
Tu´ Hoa`ng Anh, Boffa Stefania, Md. Zulfikar Alom, Vergani Alberto Arturo, Naeimeh
Laleh, Leila Bahri, Ngoc Hong Tran, and Cu¨neyt Gurcan Akc¸ora. We have passed some
great moments together. They made my PhD days so enjoyable and memorable.
I would like to thank for all the people who take participations in my experiments. I
really appreciate their efforts and time for helping me to evaluate my research work.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family members. Without their endless
supports and love I could not finish this thesis successfully. I am very grateful to them.
2
Abstract
In this thesis, we study frameworks for managing user’s privacy when disclosing personal
data with third parties from Personal Data Storage (PDS). PDS is a secure digital space
which allows individuals to collect, store, and give access to third parties. So, PDS has
inaugurated a substantial change to the way people can store and control their personal
data, by moving from a service-centric to a user-centric model. Up to now, most of the
research on PDS has focused on how to enforce user privacy preferences and how to se-
cure data stored into the PDS. In contrast, this thesis aims at designing a Privacy-aware
Personal Data Storage (P-PDS), that is, a PDS able to automatically take privacy-aware
decisions on third parties access requests in accordance with user preferences. This thesis
first demonstrates that semi-supervised learning can be successfully exploited to make a
PDS able to automatically decide whether an access request has to be authorized or not.
Furthermore, we have revised our first contribution by defining strategies able to obtain
good accuracy without requiring too much effort from the user in the training phase. At
this aim, we exploit active learning with semi-supervised approach so as to improve the
quality of the labeled training dataset. This ables to improve the performance of learning
models to predict user privacy preferences correctly.
Moreover, in the second part of the thesis we study how user’s contextual information
play a vital role in term of taking decision of whether to share personal data with third
parties. As such, consider that a service provider may provide a request for entertainment
service to PDS owner during his/her office hours. In such case, PDS owner may deny this
service as he/she is in office. That implies individual would like to accept/deny access
requests by considering his/her contextual information. Prior studies on PDS have not
considered user’s contextual information so far. Moreover, prior research has shown that
user privacy preferences may vary based on his/her contextual information. To address
this issue, this thesis also focuses to implement a contextual privacy-aware framework for
PDS (CP-PDS) which exploits contextual information to build a learning classifier that
can predict user privacy preferences under various contextual scenarios. We run several
experiments on a realistic dataset and exploiting groups of evaluators. The obtained results
show the effectiveness of the proposed approaches.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays personal data are excerpted by many information systems, such as health-care,
banking, e-commerce services etc., for providing online services [17]. Individuals are grad-
ually becoming dependent on these online services given the benefits in easing their daily
life activities (e.g., shopping, treatment). Despite their benefits, online services require lot
of personal data, even more than those strictly required for providing services. By pro-
viding personal data to third parties, individuals are loosing control on them. Moreover,
online services exchange data among them, making even more difficult for an individual to
keep the control on his/her data. Furthermore, nowadays personal data are stored into the
repository of service providers but this has many drawbacks on data privacy. One of the
most relevant is that such a paradigm on the one hand relies on the assumption that the
service provider is fully trusted and, on the other hand, prevents users from fully exploit-
ing their data, since each provider keeps a separate view of them. More precisely, we have
to completely trust the provider with respect to the release and sharing of our personal
data. Therefore, it is difficult for a user to trace which of his/her data are used/shared by
providers and for which purposes and also to fully understand the privacy implication of
personal data release. A clear example of this risk is given by the recent case of Cambridge
analytica, where Facebook has shared a large amount of personal data with this company
for not well-declared purpose [32, 92].
Figure 1.1 shows how currently service providers collect individuals personal data in
order to provide them online services. For instance, user A has to provide his/her personal
data to several service providers (e.g., hospital, bank, social media, etc.) having then
his/her data stored and replicated into each single provider’s repository. In this way, user
A loses the control on his/her personal data as well as service providers can violate the
user trust, as an example, by sharing his/her data with other third parities. So, at present,
this service-centric data storage paradigm arises a big problem for ensuring user privacy
on their personal data.
In an attempt to overcome this situation, researchers are working on the creation of
unified repositories of personal data so that individuals can handle their data properly as
well as share the data anywhere they want [9, 46, 71, 101]. As a matter of fact, individuals
9
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Figure 1.1: Data stored in service providers’ databases
interact with various online service systems according to a service-centric data storage
paradigm, where data of individuals are stored by and under control of services [91]. The
main idea behind Personal Data Storage [6, 35, 91] is to store personal data to be shared
with different data sources into a unique logical repository under the control of end users.
This view is also enabled by recent developments in privacy legislation and, in particular,
by the new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), whose art. 20 states the right
to data portability, according to which “the data subject shall have the right to receive
the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in
a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format”, thus making possible data
collection into a PDS. Mainly, GDPR gives control to individuals over their personal data
whether they want to share or not with third parties. Moreover, it simplifies the regulatory
environment for business purpose by unifying the regulation within the EU [4]. In addition,
the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) provides Code of Conduct for GDPR Compliance offers
a consistent and comprehensive framework that can help service providers for complying
with the European Union’s GDPR. Moreover, the CSA Code of Conduct offers a compliance
tool - Privacy Level Agreement (PLA) that provides guidelines regarding the level of data
protection offered by a cloud service provider with a mechanism so as to identify a baseline
of mandatory personal data protection legal requirements across the European Union (EU).
Figure 1.2 shows the concept of personal data storage (PDS). According to PDS ar-
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Figure 1.2: The concept of Personal Data Storage (PDS)
chitecture, for instance, user A’s personal data is stored into his/her PDS controlled, in
terms of sharing data with third parties, directly by user A. In addition, we can consider
cloud storage for PDS so as individual’s personal data can be stored in a remote location
that can be accessed by the permission of the owner. This model can be considered as a
user-centric storage model [91], where data owners can control their own data. The data
stored into PDS can be used for further usages. In this way, users have control to share
their personal data with third parties.
Although the PDS paradigm ensures that individuals have strong control on personal
data, an important issue is how users can easily set their privacy preferences on personal
data release according to their privacy requirements. Interestingly, several studies have
shown that average users might have difficulties in properly setting potentially complex
privacy preferences [3, 59, 63, 89]. For instance, Facebook offer a privacy setting page that
allows users to specify their own privacy preferences but most of the users can not properly
set up privacy preferences according to their requirements [61]. Thus, this is a challenging
job to design a privacy preference framework for end users since most of the cases users are
not so expert to configure their privacy preferences properly. Furthermore, users are getting
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tiredness or feeling bore if they are going to set up their privacy preferences manually [61].
However, there is no proper tools that can help users to set up their privacy preferences in
PDS yet.
Thus, the main goal of this dissertation is to study and design privacy preference mech-
anisms that help users to set their privacy preferences in PDS. To do so, we have exploited
machine learning tools so that our proposed privacy preference mechanisms can automati-
cally set up privacy preferences based on user activities. We also proposed new approaches
with active learning to improve the prediction of user privacy preferences correctly on access
requests.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis lies in (1) designing, and modeling the architecture for
privacy-aware personal data storage, and (2) studying, designing, prototyping, and evalu-
ating the performance of mechanisms to automatically set up PDS user privacy preferences.
In summary, this thesis provides the following research contributions:
1. We propose a new technical approach that empowers individuals to have better con-
trol on their personal data in PDS. Particularly, we present a privacy-aware PDS
architecture by focusing on two logical data zones based on the categories of per-
sonal data. Moreover, we present a privacy-aware PDS that set privacy preference
strategies based on risks and benefits in term of data release with respect to the data
owners perspective.
2. We propose different learning algorithms that allow a fine-grained learning of the
privacy aptitudes of PDS owners. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that
semi-supervised learning can be successfully exploited to make a PDS able to auto-
matically decide whether an access request has to be authorized or not. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to exploit the correlations among the dimensions
of an access request elements that impact individual decisions so as to build up the
learning models. The learned models are then used to predict the class label of third
party access requests by exploiting user feedbacks on a training dataset.
3. This thesis also enhances the focus on the optimization for the learning processes
so as to have a more usable PDS, in terms of reducing the effort for the training
phase, as well as a more conservative approach w.r.t. users’ privacy, when learning
models produce conflicting decisions on access requests. At this aim, our studies
deeply revise the learning process of active learning (AL) approach that tunes the
uncertainty sampling strategy so as to select more relevant labeled training dataset
to improve the performance the learning models.
4. We further extended the learning processes as to not only considering the elements of
access requests to train up learning models but also exploiting user contextual data in
term of defining privacy preference in PDS. More particularly, the proposed approach
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uses the current situation of PDS owner as learning features so as to build privacy
learning models. The aim of this extension is to design a contextual based privacy
preference model that in presence of information about access request context is able
to react so as to have a decision that takes into account also users’ preferences w.r.t.
the context.
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation is structured into six chapters organized as follows:
Chapter 1 mainly discusses the motivation and the main contributions of this
dissertation.
Chapter 2 discusses previous work on privacy preferences on users’ personal data.
It mainly introduces the preliminary works on Personal Data Storage (PDS) to help
users for setting privacy preferences. Afterwards, it summarizes the existing work that
exploit user’s contextual information so as to build privacy preference models to protect
personal data from unauthorized third parties. The chapter closes with the related work
on personal data protection in social media domains.
Chapter 3 describes our proposed PDS architecture based on risk-benefit metrics for
ensuring user’s privacy. The proposed privacy preference mechanism measures the benefit
and risk of user in releasing personal data with third parties and compare these values to
take final decision.
Chapter 4 describes the various approaches to learn PDS owners’ privacy habits. At
this purpose, in this chapter, we present three machine learning approaches to predict
users opinions on releasing personal data from PDS and the experiments we have done to
determine which learning approach provides better accuracy in PDS scenarios.
Chapter 5 illustrates the privacy preference learning approaches that focus to improve
the quality of users feedbacks in training phase so as to improve the performance of the
proposed approaches. At this purpose, in this chapter, we mainly present an extended
version of active learning called as history-based active learning (HBAL) and derive
personalized history-based active learning (PHBAL) from HBAL to predict class labels
when classifiers produce conflicting decisions on access requests.
Chapter 6 focuses on user’s contextual information and defines a learning approach
exploiting contextual features to learn user privacy preferences.
Appendix A enlists a list of publications where the research activities described in
this thesis are presented.
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Introduction
Our research has focused on proposing privacy preference mechanisms on PDS, thus we
will start to discuss the related work that have focused to implement privacy preference
mechanisms on PDS using various strategies. Therefore first we discuss the related work
that exploit different strategies for privacy preference mechanisms on PDS in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.4 we explain machine learning approaches based on non-contextual data that
have been used to implement privacy preferences for protecting personal data. After that,
we cover those approaches that exploit users contextual data and non-contextual data for
learning users privacy preferences to protect personal data from unwanted third parities
access in PDS in Section 2.5.
2.2 Privacy preferences on PDS
In order to address the growing problem of spreading personal data over the Internet,
researchers have started to propose different approaches that can mitigate this problem.
In particular, several approaches have been defined based on PDS to fend the spreading
personal data so as individuals able to control their data in term of sharing with others. De
Montjoye et al [35] presented openPDS/SafeAnswers mechanism that allows individuals to
collect, and store their personal data in PDS as well as give access to their metadata to
third parties based on privacy policies. The framework defines a mechanism for returning
to third parties only aggregated answers, based on their questions, instead of raw data.
Although this framework never shares raw data, there is room for malicious applications
to infer more information through a specific sequence of questions-answers, which can
eventually breach user privacy. Allard et al [6] proposed a framework to design a personal
data server approach and they identify the main technical barriers for implementing PDS
and try to find the preliminary solutions. They suggested portable and secure devices with
NAND flash chip for storing personal data so that user can fully control how his/her data
are shared with others.
14
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Recently, researchers have proposed models for user-centric storage in the cloud domain,
where data are stored and controlled by users. For instance, Oort [26] is a user-centric cloud
storage system that organizes data by users rather than applications, considering global
queries which find and combine relevant data fields from relevant users. Moreover, it allows
users to choose which applications can access their own data, and which types of data to
be shared with which users. In [74], authors suggest mechanism for secure data storage
that are able to store personal data and could be accessed from anywhere using queries
using the secret sharing technique. Recently, [114] proposed a Block chain-based Personal
Data Store (BC-PDS) framework which leverage on BlockChain to secure the storage of
personal data.
Sieve [98] allows user to upload encrypted data to a single cloud storage. It utilizes
key-homomorphic scheme to provide cryptographically enforced access control. Amber [27]
has proposed an architecture where users can choose applications to manipulate their data-
but it does not mention either how the global queries work or how the application providers
interact with. In [35], authors developed a user-centric framework that share with third
parity only the answers to a query instead of the raw data. Mortier et al. [70] have proposed
a trusted platform called Databox, which can manage personal data by a fine grained access
control mechanism but do not focus on policy learning. Our privacy-aware PDS is different
from other approaches in the matter of taking into account the learning mechanisms that
can learn user’s privacy preferences from user participations automatically so as to define
users privacy requirements in PDS.
2.3 Privacy preferences in social media
Besides PDS, we also focus on the related work on social media privacy preferences. Many
researchers have focused on the development of privacy preference models for Online Social
Networks (OSNs) [33, 39, 41], where the authors proposed frameworks to share their data
with predefined list of friends based on set of rules. In [30], authors stated an access control
framework that provides flexible and fine-grained controls on how third party applications
(TPAs) can access OSN user’s data based on user-specified policies in terms of relationship
between the user and the application. In [86], authors proposed a framework that prohibit
untrusted applications from leaking users’ private information, whereas, in [97] authors
enforced sandbox in both server and client sides so as to restrict information flow from
users to application developers. [93] proposed a framework that captures user’s privacy
intentions with clustering approach based on explicit user behavior. The main idea is that
once the user adds a friend into a cluster then this friend get permission to access to all data
in that cluster. In [7,43], authors proposed a privacy-preserving online advertising systems
that aim to protect user profiles from ad brokers. [51] introduced privacy preference based
on different types of service. In [47], authors proposed a model for privacy preference in
terms of a hierarchy of questions which can be asked to users. [66] introduced the PViz
privacy tool which allows the user to understand the visibility of his/her profile according
to natural sub-groupings of friends, and at different levels of granularity. Basically, these
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works enhanced privacy preference based on the feedback from a user. But as we know
that average users are not expert enough to set up their privacy requirement in term of
providing appropriate answers in a set of questions, thus these works could not provide
well defined mechanisms for user privacy preferences. In fact, prior researchers have shown
that users’ privacy can sometimes be violated with social networks [38, 40]. In addition,
other related work proposed different risk models [2, 50, 53, 83, 99] so that users would
be able to understand the privacy risk for sharing their personal data with particular
friends or others. Moreover, there are some frameworks which avail the concept of incentive
mechanism [100, 110] for sharing data with third parties. [54] explores an game theoretic
framework by which they measure the effects of different incentives and potential trust
for sharing data. The above privacy preference models provide good performance social
networking services but still now, they are being criticized for failing to adequately protect
their users’ privacy [18].
In our proposal, we focus on to reduce user privacy threat in term of sharing data with
third parties but in different way. Our approach exploits semi-supervised learning so as
to take minimum feedbacks from users about their privacy preferences on access requests
with the aim of reducing user’s burden. Our analysis of learning privacy demonstrates that
user’s decisions on access request have been influenced by the correlation among elements
of access requests so as the ensemble learning produces less false negative and positive rates
compared to other approaches.
2.4 Privacy preferences learning based on non-contextual
data
Non-contextual data refers to the data fields which are not directly related to users present
situation. In this section, we focus on the work that exploit non-contextual data for set-
ting privacy preferences. In [52], authors have proposed an approach that optimizes the
utility-privacy tradeoff in personalized services as web search. In [55] examines different
dimensions of privacy practices that impact user’s willingness to permit the collection of
data for Online behavioral advertising (OBA). In [108], authors have presented a frame-
work based on the concept of personalized anonymity that takes into account customized
privacy requirements. Some research are designed to limit access to personal information
within an organization, by deploying privacy-aware access control [69] within that organi-
zation can make decisions and enforce access control policies, intercepting queries to data
repositories and returning sanitized views (if any) on requested data.
Recently, Nakamura et al. [75] proposed a machine-learning approach to set up user per-
sonalized privacy settings for third party access. Similarly to our approach, the proposed
learning model is based on information on service providers, type of requested personal
data, and usage purposes. In particular, the approach presented in [75] delivers a set of
80 questions to each user at the time of registration to a new service. Among the re-
ceived answers, the approach repeatedly selects a combination of five questions-answers as
training data, and use supervised multiclass SVM [44] to learn individual privacy settings.
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Then, the combination with the best accuracy is selected. Our approach differentiates
from work in [75] along several directions. First, we adopt semi-supervised approaches
(i.e., Expectation-Maximization (EM)-based algorithms) so as to reduce the user burden
on getting training dataset. As it will be presented in Section 4.4, EM-based approaches
provide a better accuracy than SVM with the same training set. Moreover, we obtain
accuracy values similar to those obtained in the proposal in [75] but with only 40 initial
questions as training dataset, whilst [75] requires 80 for each registered service. Further-
more, we explored different learning algorithms to find the best fitting one but also to
investigate how correlations among access request features impact the individual decision
process. Proposal in [75] only considered SVM. [8, 34, 39] have investigated the use of
semi-supervised and unsupervised approaches to automatically extract privacy settings in
social media. In [80], authors have mentioned that location based data can be considered
contextual data. They have compared the accuracy of manually set privacy preferences
with the one of an automated mechanism based on machine learning. The results show
that machine learning approaches provide better result than user-defined policies.
The issue of privacy preference suggestion has also been investigated in other contexts,
such as for instance social networks. Indeed, almost all social media have a privacy setting
page to allow users to set up their privacy preferences. However, studies have shown
that users are facing many problems in the privacy setting specification task due to its
complexity [42, 59]. Thus, a substantial research effort has been done to automatically
configure user privacy settings with minimal effort. For instance, [80] shows a comparison
of user-defined sharing policies with an automated mechanism based on machine learning.
The results show that machine learning approaches have better accuracy than user-defined
policies. Semi-supervised and unsupervised approaches have been investigated in [34, 39]
to automatically extract privacy settings in social media.
Differently from the above mentioned papers, we use semi-supervised machine learning
tools to set up privacy preferences in PDS, by taking into account different features, which
are specific of the PDS scenario (e.g., benefits, trust in the third party). Other research
work proposed privacy preserving frameworks using machine learning tools [49, 112, 113].
However, in these work the focus is different from our proposal, in that authors primarily
focused on privacy-preserving distributed computation, that is, how data holders can col-
laborate to find predictive models from their joint data without revealing their own data
to each other.
2.5 Privacy preferences learning based on contextual data
A number of studies have been carried out to understand user’s privacy preferences by take
into account user’s contextual data. Researchers already implemented contextual based
privacy preferences in smart-phone environments. For instance [78, 96, 105, 106] proposed
a mechanism to predict permission decisions at runtime that relies on user’s contextual
information in mobile platforms, whereas [95, 109, 117] proposed user’s location sharing
privacy preferences by considering contextual information. L. Yuan et al. [116] presented a
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privacy-aware model for photo sharing based on machine learning that exploits contextual
information.
Smith et al. [87] presented different solutions that enable people to share contextual
information in mobile networks, whereas, in [104], authors observed that people’s willing-
ness for sharing information are impacted of various factors. In [45] presented a framework
for automatic estimation of privacy risk of data based on the sharing context. T. liang et
al. [56] developed a learning approach that recommends context-aware app by utilizing a
tensor-based framework so as to effectively integrate user’s preferences, app category infor-
mation and multi-view features. In [94], authors presented a privacy preference model for
helping users to manage their privacy in context-aware systems in term of sharing location
on the basis of the general user population using crowd-sourcing architecture. Bigwood
et al. [12] have evaluated different machine-learning algorithms so as to build information
sharing models. Schlegel et al. [81] proposed a mechanism that summaries the number
of requests made by the requesters for sharing his/her location. Liu et al. [60] proposed
a decision making approach for sharing private data (such as location) in the context of
Android permissions. With this aim, they have built each user profile based on their de-
cision and make users’ clusters based on their profiles similarities and then build a single
predictive model for each cluster of users. Bilogrevic et al. [14] presented a privacy pref-
erence framework that (semi-)automatically predicts sharing decision, based on personal
and contextual features. The authors only try to focus on general information sharing with
nearby people such as location. These approaches are not able to set up privacy preferences
by considering others contextual data such as time, activities etc. However, our proposal
having learning model that exploit all possible user’s contextual data for setting privacy
preferences in PDS.
2.6 Limitations in the existing privacy preference mecha-
nisms
Most of the existing techniques offer users to set up their privacy preferences manually by
selecting yes/no options for a set of questions. Interestingly, several studies have shown
that with this approach, average users might have difficulties in properly setting potentially
complex privacy preferences [3, 59]. To resolve this complexity, we proposed privacy pref-
erence frameworks that exploit machine learning tools for learning user privacy preferences
according to user feedbacks so as to set up privacy preferences automatically. Some recent
research work also exploit machine learning tools to implement privacy preference frame-
works [14, 75, 80]. The main intension of these studies is to design a framework that can
automatically configure user privacy preferences with minimal user efforts. But the fact is
that they did not investigate how the correlations of the learning features can impact the
user decisions in term of configuring privacy preferences in PDS. Considering this issue,
we extensively exploit different machine learning approaches to check how the correlations
of various dimensions of features impact user decisions and improve the performance of
the proposed framework. With this motivation, we use single-view, multi-view and ensem-
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ble learning techniques. Our experiments show that ensemble approach provides better
result over other approaches. Consequently, it confirms that user decisions on access re-
quests are influenced by the correlation of the learning features. Moreover, we also exploit
history-based active learning with ensemble approach so as to reduce user efforts to get
good quality labeled training dataset that can improve the prediction accuracy w.r.t user’s
decisions on access requests. The benefit of this framework is in a better understanding of
the requirements needed for configuring users’ privacy preferences in PDS. Moreover, this
results in a better choice and usage of machine learning techniques so as to design more
effective and efficient privacy preference frameworks.
2.7 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we focused a privacy preference frameworks to PDS owners for making
PDS owners able to configure PDS privacy preferences according to their requirements. For
privacy preference, different frameworks have been discussed. These methods mainly focus
on privacy specification and enforcement for ensuring user privacy in different domains.
Privacy preference in PDS is a relatively new issue and has not been deeply studied.
The most primitive and important proposal for configuring privacy preference in PDS is
based on answers/questions that can breach user privacy by sequence similar kinds of
questions. To address this problem, some proposals have been discussed based on machine
learning. In the following of this thesis, we will analyze more in depth the privacy preference
by proposing new frameworks based on machine learning so as to configure user privacy
preference automatically. We will also focus on the usage of different kind of machine
learning approaches with little bit of modifications for trying to find the best privacy
preference framework.
Chapter 3
A Risk-Benefit Driven
Architecture
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, research in the field of PDS has grown drastically. This has resulted into the
definition of several techniques to protect personal data so that unauthorized third parties
cannot get access to PDS [6, 35]. Although, such papers proposed some privacy policies
to protect personal data from unauthorized access, nevertheless they did not consider the
fine-grained holistic view of data owners’ perspective regarding their data.
We strongly believe that the decision on whether to release or not personal data is a
subjective matter and depends on the evaluation of the benefits and risks connected to the
data release. Thus, in this chapter we propose a risk-benefit approach for the design of a
privacy-aware PDS. Data owners evaluate access requests from two different perspectives.
One is related to the risk of sharing the requested data with third parties, whereas the
other one is related to the benefits the data owner can get by accepting the access request
for getting the online service. Thus, different data owners may have different evaluation
about the same risks and benefits of an access request.
We also believe that the level of sensitivity of personal data in PDS is not equal and
also depends on the aptitude of the PDS owner. Thus, we consider that individual may
want to give more privacy protection on confidential data to preserve them in more secure
ways than non-confidential data. The sensitivity level of data is a subjective matter. For
example, user A may consider that his/her email address should not be publicly disclosed.
So in this case, (s)he wants to assign a high sensitivity to such data. On the other hand,
user B may consider that his/her email address does not need to be hidden. Another
dimension that should be taken into account when processing an access request is whether
or not the requested data are really indispensable to get the service. For instance, a third
party1 like eBay, which is a e-commerce company, sales its products via Internet. Thus,
it generates an access request to access PDS, including data fields like credit card number
1We use the terms data consumer, third party, or online services interchangeably.
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for payment purpose and home address for delivery purpose. However, all the data fields
mentioned in access request may not be indispensable for providing the service.
Unfortunately, most of the available approaches do not take into account data confi-
dentially and indispensability when designing the architecture of the PDS. To overcome
this, in this chapter we confined PDS data into two data zones. One is confidential data
zone and another one is non-confidential data zone. As it will be discussed in the chapter,
data stored in the confidential zone will be released only if: (1) they are indispensable
by the requesting service, and (2) the data consumer privacy practice satisfies the user
preferences. This strategy implies that in case the requested data is confidential but non-
indispensable by the requesting service, the access is automatically denied, without user
preferences evaluation. This brings benefits in access evaluation efficiency, but also it lows
the risk of evaluating mis-configured privacy preferences, specified by not expert users, on
confidential data.
In addition to this, the proposed PDS is equipped with a variety of strategies to evaluate
an access request on non-confidential data that depends on the satisfaction of user privacy
preferences, as well as on the data indispensability and the confidentiality. Such strategies
are able to trade between benefits and risks of the data release. Therefore, this chapter
provides the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first proposing a new model for privacy-
aware PDS design that takes in consideration the risks and benefits of data release
with respect to the data owner’s perspective.
• We propose a new architecture for privacy-aware PDS, where we consider two logical
data zones: confidential and non-confidential data zone that impact the strategies to
perform access control.
• We devise a set of strategies for the release of personal data able to take into con-
sideration various dimensions of the data release, i.e., privacy, efficiency, and the
risk-benefit trade-off.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the overall
concepts of our proposed privacy-aware PDS’s architecture. Section 3.3 presents a summary
of privacy preferences for PDS. Section 3.4 describes the enforcement strategies, whereas,
Section 3.5 illustrates the requirement to calculate the risk and benefit values.
3.2 Privacy-aware PDS
The typical PDS architecture does not consider different data zones based on the data
sensitivity level. To cope with this issue, we impose a logical separation between confidential
and non-confidential data so that we can take extra care on confidential data to protect
them from third parties.
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Figure 3.1: Privacy-aware PDS architecture
The proposed architecture is shown in the Figure 3.1. In our model, we divide the
Personal Data Storage (PDS) logically in two different data zones: confidential and non-
confidential data zone. Basically, we consider that data owners can assign a sensitivity
level to their personal data. We also consider that data consumers can assign levels to the
requested data objects with respect to indispensability for providing services. Thus, the
requested data are partitioned into indispensable and non-indispensable in terms of data
consumers’ perspective. For each data zone, we propose several strategies for data release.
Our idea is that the external application makes request to access PDS data through the
Authorization and Query Generator (AQG) module. The AQG module allows only the
registered data consumers to access PDS. AQG generates queries based on the access re-
quest to obtain the requested data objects that the external applications need for providing
services to the data owners.
Then the Enforcement Module (EnM) verifies the queries based on predefined rules,
aka user privacy preferences, specified on the requested data. First, the EnM checks the
categories of the requested data objects. In particular, the following scenarios are possible
(see Table 3.1):
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Table 3.1: Enforcement Strategies
Data owner’s perspective Data consumer’s perspective Enforcement strategy
Confidential Indispensable Measure the weight between benefits and risk
Non-confidential Non-indispensable Depend on user benefits
Confidential Non-indispensable No permission to share
Non-confidential Indispensable Permission to share
• If the requested data objects are confidential and non-indispensable, then, according
to our strategies, the EnM denies the access request, otherwise, EnM enforces privacy
preferences on the requested data objects. If the privacy practices adopted by the
data consumer sending the access request satisfy all conditions specified in the data
owner privacy preferences, EnM sends a request to Decision Maker (DM) to access
PDS data, otherwise the access will be denied.
• If the requested data fields are non-confidential and indispensable, DM shares these
data fields, since the data owner assigns them a low sensitivity degree. In this way, our
privacy-aware PDS can enhance its performance compared with other PDSs, because
typically PDSs consider same level of privacy preferences for all kinds of personal
data.
• If the requested data fields are non-confidential and non-indispensable, DM measures
only the benefits. Since the data have been classified by the data owner as non-
confidential, we assume that the owner does not see any significant risk connected to
their release. If the benefits are higher than zero, then DM shares these requested
data fields, otherwise it denies the access.
• If the requested data fields are confidential and indispensable, DM measures risks
and benefits of data release. After measuring these two values, DM compares risks
and benefits. If the benefits are higher than risks, then it approves the release of the
requested data. If the benefits are less than risks, then it denies the access request;
otherwise, it asks the data owner for decision.
When a request is approved with the requested data fields then DM module sends back
the data to AQG module. Finally, AQG sends all the approved data fields to the external
applications.
Risks and benefits are the key factors of our privacy-aware PDS model. Risk means
something for which the users do not want to share their data for getting services from
data consumers. On the other hand, benefits mean something for which the users want to
take services from data consumers. We will discuss this further in Section 3.5.
A flowchart describing the overall privacy protection strategies of the proposed privacy-
aware PDS is shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: An overall flowchart of enforcement strategies
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3.3 Privacy Preferences
According the proposed model, privacy preferences are defined based on well-known pri-
vacy concepts, like data consumers, data, purposes, services, obligations, conditions, and
retention, etc,. In the following, we will describe all these elements in more details.
Data Consumers: We refer to external applications requiring data from PDS as Data
Consumers. Typically, data consumers are any third-party application. We distinguish
data consumers based on their service types and scope, such as commercial data consumers,
social media data consumers, medical data consumers, and so on. For example, let assume
a PDS owner wishes to purchase items from Amazon site. In this case, he/she needs to
allow Amazon as a data consumer to access his/her PDS to share personal data according
to his/her privacy preferences for getting this service.
Data: Data elements identify the data objects to which a user’s preference applies. A
PDS may contain different types of personal data, like profile information (Name, Middle
Name, Surname, Address, Phone No, E-mail, Birth Date, Gender, Political View, etc.,),
credit card information (Card Type, Card Number, Expiry Date, etc.,), eHeath-care infor-
mation (Blood Pressure, Heart Beat, Weight, Disease Name, Diagnosis Report, etc.,). In
our model, we assume data are classified according to two dimensions:
– Indispensability: During the registration to PDS, a data consumer has to specify,
for each of its services, which data object is indispensable for the execution of the
provided service. All the remaining data are considered as non-indispensable for that
particular service. For example, suppose that the data consumer is Amazon and the
service is book purchasing. Amazon may specify that the data objects mail address
for shipment, and credit card information for paying the cost as indispensable data.
Moreover, Amazon may also specify some other data objects which are not necessary
for providing the service, like phone number and email , but that it requests as
well for better service customization. We refer to this type of data objects as non-
indispensable data for this particular service.
– Confidentiality: Our model assumes that data are classified according to their sen-
sitivity/confidentiality with respect to data owner’s point of view. Thus, we assume
that each data owner assigns a sensitivity level to his/her personal data.
Purposes: In general, a data consumer notifies the data owner about the intended
purposes via privacy policies [24]. Data owners can constraint the release of their data by
posing conditions on allowed purposes in the privacy preferences. For example, the privacy
statement “the doctor can use the user’s health related data to give proper treatment or
can use these data for analyzing the reason for which the disease outbreaks in a area”
defines two separate purposes, that is, “treatment” and “research” for which the health
related data will be used. In this case, perhaps, the data owner wants to disclose his/her
data for “treatment” but not for “research”. It usually happens that the same data may
be used for different purposes. So, the data owner should have the right to state for what
purposes the data can be used [58].
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Figure 3.3: A simple purpose tree
In our model, we consider the concept of purpose tree [24] for structuring purposes.
Figure 3.3 gives a simple example of purpose tree. Let p be a purpose in purpose tree
PT . We consider that descendants (pi) represent all purposes, including itself pi which are
similar otherwise, we assume that purposes are dissimilar. For example, suppose an access
request specifies the marketing purpose, if our model allows this intended purpose to access
PDS then it also allows that access for all purposes which are descendants of marketing.
Service: In our view, a service is a process owned by a data consumer through which
the data owner has some sort of interaction. For example, eBay provides e-commerce
services to a PDS owner.
Obligations: Obligation is a process by which data owners can impose constraints
on how personal data should be handled. Every obligation can be associated with an
action [10]. Obligations can be divided into two types: pre-obligations and post-obligations.
Pre-obligation means fulfilling some conditions before an access is allowed, whereas post-
obligations mean fulfilling some conditions after the access is granted. For example, a
patient may disclose his/her medical information to doctors for the purpose of treatment
and impose that (s)he can not disclose these information to other doctors for the same
purpose; this is an example of post obligations. On the other hand, an example of pre-
obligation is when doctors need to get legal guardian authorizations to collect medical
information of minors for the purpose of treatment.
Context conditions: Privacy preferences can not only specify which data can be
used for which purposes but also impose some conditions, besides obligations, that shall
be satisfied to get access to data stored into PDS. Such conditions depend on the context
in which the request has been issues. For example, a data owner may impose a condition
stating that any external application can access his/her PDS only in a particular time
frame. A formal definition of context can be defined as follows [1]:
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Definition 3.3.1. Context represents any information that can describe the current situ-
ation of an entity. An entity can be a person, place, or object that is considered relevant
to the interaction between a user and any type of applications.
Retention: The data owner can specify how long his/her data will be alive for pro-
cessing. The third party application can store, use, and process the data during the time
mentioned by the data owner in the retention parameter.
We are now ready to define privacy preferences:
Definition 3.3.2. PDS privacy preference. A privacy preference (PP) regulates the
release of personal data stored at PDS and is formalized as follows:
PP=(DC, d, p, st, O, c, RE)
where st is the type of service offered by data consumer DC, d denotes a piece of data,
p denotes a purpose, O is the obligation,2 c denotes the context condition,3 whereas RE is
the retention.
Example 3.3.1. Let us consider a data owner u that wants to regulate the release of
his/her blood pressure data to a doctor, only if the request comes from Italy. Moreover,
suppose that u wants to disclose this data only for treatment purpose and (s)he wants
that the data will not be retained by the service for more than one month. Additionally,
(s)he wants to receive a notification via email once the data is accessed. These privacy
requirements can be encoded through the following privacy preference:
PP ✏
✩
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✫
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✪
DC ✏ doctor,
d ✏ blood Pressure,
p ✏ treatment,
st ✏ health Service,
O ✏ ♣sendemailtome@me.it,
c ✏ ♣IpAddressCountry ✏ Italy",
RE ✏ oneMonth;
According to the proposed strategy, user privacy preferences have to be evaluated on
data consumer access request. As described in the following, we assume that an access
request contains information about data consumer privacy practice (e.g., purpose, service
type, etc.,). In addition to these elements, we also keep into account that data consumers
might temporarily offer special treatments associated to the required service, in terms of
discount, coupon, etc. While this information does not impact the privacy preferences
2Obligation contains a set of actions representing processes that can be executed on the PDS (e.g.,
sending email, OS primitives, etc.,).
3We assume context condition are expressed as boolean expressions over a set of predefined attributes
modeling context properties (e.g., access request time, IP address, etc.,).
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evaluation, it might impact the estimation of the benefits that might be gained by granting
the access (see Section 3.5). Based on this, an access request is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.3. Access request. An access request AR is a tuple:
AR=(DC, d, p, st, o)
where st is the type of service owned by data consumer DC, requiring via AR to access
data d stored at PDS for the purposes p. If the access is granted, DC will provide an
additional benefit, called offer, and measured by o.4
Example 3.3.2. Let us consider the case an application owned by doctor requests to
access the blood pressure for providing health services for treatment purpose. Moreover,
let assume that the application temporarily offer an additional discount of 30% for future
services. The corresponding access request is modeled as follows:
AR ✏
✩
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✫
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✬
✪
DC ✏ doctor,
d ✏ blood Pressure,
p ✏ treatment,
st ✏ health Service,
o ✏ 0, 30;
4In this thesis, we assume that an offer is modeled as a value in [0,1]. As an example, it might represent
% of offered discount. More complex offers can be modeled as well.
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Algorithm 1 Access request evaluation on a PDS
INPUT Let AR=♣DC, d, p, st, o! be the access request submitted to PDS Let PP base
be the set of privacy preferences specified by PDS owner OUTPUT Access denied, if the
AR is not authorized, Access granted, otherwise Let pp=♣DC, d, p, st, O, c, RE! " PP base
be the privacy preferences that applies to AR, i.e., AR.d=pp.d ; // We assume that a
single privacy preference applies to an access request. The algorithm can
be easily adapted to the case of multiple privacy preferences.
; // We also assume that the access request is on a single data item. The
algorithm can be easily extended to mutiple data items (see Example 3).
if d is confidential and indispensable then
if (AR.p " descendant♣pp.p!) AND (AR.st ✏ pp.st) AND (checkCondition♣pp.c, AR!
then
r=risk(AR) b=benefit(AR) if b → r then
enforce Obligations(pp.O) return Access granted
else
if b ➔ r then
return Access denied
else
return Ask data owner’s decisions
end
end
else
return Access denied
end
if d is non-confidential and non-indispensable then
if (AR.p " descendant♣pp.p!) AND (AR.st ✏ pp.st) AND (checkCondition♣pp.c, AR!
then
b=benefit(AR) if b → 0 then
enforce Obligations(pp.O) return Access granted
else
return Access denied
end
else
return Access denied
end
if d is non-confidential and indispensable then
if (AR.p " descendant♣pp.p!) AND (AR.st ✏ pp.st) AND (checkCondition♣pp.c, AR!
then
enforceObligations(pp.O) return Access granted
else
return Access denied
end
if d is confidential and non-indispensable then
return Access denied
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3.4 Privacy Preference Enforcement
The overall procedure for the evaluation of an access request AR ✏ ♣DC, d, p, st, o" sub-
mitted to a PDS is described in Algorithm 1. We use the dot notation to refer to specific
components within a tuple. Algorithm 1 evaluates the access request AR according to
our enforcement strategies, (see Table 3.1) and the privacy preferences stated by the data
owner explained in Section 3.3. First, Algorithm 1 checks the categories of the requested
data objects. Here, we have four cases, according to the assigned data categories. In the
first combination, if the requested data objects are confidential and indispensable, then
Algorithm 1 checks the privacy preference PP holding on the requested data. If the ac-
cess request AR is authorized by PP , then Algorithm 1 measures the risk and benefit
values, using risk♣" and benefit♣" functions, respectively, otherwise, it denies the access
request. After measuring the risk and benefit, Algorithm 1 compares these two values. If
benefit is greater than risk, then Algorithm 1 grants the access request AR by imposing
the obligations. If benefit is less than risk, then Algorithm 1 denies the access request;
otherwise, Algorithm 1 asks the data owner for decision. In this case, the Algorithm 1
sequentially checks the elements of privacy preference for authorization and measures the
risk and benefit thus, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O♣n" where n is the number
of comparison.
The second case is when the requested data objects are non-confidential and non-
indispensable. In this case, Algorithm 1 checks the privacy preference that applies to the
access request AR. If the access request AR is authorized by the privacy preference, then
Algorithm 1 measures only the benefit value, using benefit♣" function, otherwise, it denies
the access request. If benefit is greater than zero, Algorithm 1 grants the access request by
imposing the specified obligation, otherwise, it denies the access request AR. In this case,
the Algorithm 1 sequentially checks the elements of privacy preference for authorization
and measures the benefit value thus, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O♣n" where n
is the number of comparison.
The third case is when the requested data objects are non-confidential and indispens-
able. In this case, Algorithm 1 applies the privacy preference PP ✏ ♣DC, d, p, st, O, c, RE"
on the access request AR for authorization. If the access request AR is authorized, then
Algorithm 1 grants the access request and impose obligations to access data stored in PDS,
otherwise, it denies the access request AR. In this case, the Algorithm 1 sequentially checks
the elements of privacy preference for authorization and does not need to measure the risk
and benefit value thus, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O♣n" where n is the number
of comparison.
In the final case, if requested data objects are confidential and non-indispensable, then
Algorithm 1 denies the access request. In this case, the Algorithm 1 does not need to
checks the elements of privacy preference for authorization thus, the time complexity of
Algorithm 1 is constant, O♣1".
Example 3.4.1. Let us consider the following access request:
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♣eBay, ♣name, home number,
street name, postal code, country, phone number,
card type, card number, expiry date, card owner,
email!, ♣delivery, payment!, e✁ commerce,
o ✏ 45%!
Algorithm 1 checks the categories of the requested data fields and enforces the pri-
vacy preferences on this access request. In this example, there are two purposes namely,
delivery, and payment. Suppose that Algorithm 1 determines that the set of data fields
{name, home number, street name, postal code, country
✭
are indispensable, whereas data
✥
phone number} is non-indispensable for providing e-commerce service for delivery pur-
pose. Similarly, suppose that for payment purpose, Algorithm 1 determines that the set of
data fields {card type, card number, expiry date, card owner} are indispensable, whereas
data
✥
email
✭
is non-indispensable for providing e-commerce services. Now, Algorithm 1
searches the requested data fields to find their sensitivity levels with respect to data owners’
perspective. Basically, three scenarios may happen.
Scenario-1: Suppose that Algorithm 1 that determines all requested data fields {name,
home number, street name, postal code, country, phone number, card type, card number,
expiry date, card owner, email} of the access request are in the non-confidential data zone.
Then, according to our strategies (cfr. Table 3.1), these data fields can be shared, apart
from email and phone number because these are non-indispensable data fields. In this case,
we need to find the benefits using the function benefit♣! for email and phone number. Thus,
Algorithm 1 measures benefits of data owner for these data. If the benefit is higher than
zero, then email and phone number can be shared with data consumer.
Scenario-2: Suppose that Algorithm 1 determines that all data fields {name,
home number, street name, postal code, country, phone number, card type, card number,
expiry date, card owner, email} of the access request are in the confidential data zone,
then according to our strategies, Algorithm 1 measures both benefit and risk values using
benefit♣! and risk♣! and compare them to decide whether the requested data fields can
be shared or not (cfr. Table 3.1). In this case, since email and phone number are non-
indispensable data fields, Algorithm 1 does not allow to share these fields according to our
strategies. Thus, we can see here that all requested data fields of an access request are not
fully shared.
Scenario-3: Suppose that Algorithm 1 determines that some data fields, say {name,
home number, street name, postal code, card type, card number, expiry date, email} of
the access request are in the non-confidential zone and the remaining data fields, say { coun-
try, phone number,card owner} are in the confidential data zone, then since the data fields
{name, home number, street name, postal code, card type, card number, expiry date} are
indispensable and stored in the non-confidential zone, they can be shared, as mentioned
in Scenario-1, apart from email because it is a non-indispensable data field. In this case,
Algorithm 1 finds the benefits using the benefit♣! function. If the benefit is higher than
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zero, then email can be shared with the data consumer. On the other hand, since the
remaining data fields { country, phone number,card owner} are in the confidential data
zone, then, according to our strategies, Algorithm 1 finds out both benefit and risk values
using benefit♣! and risk♣! and compare them to decide whether these requested data can
be shared or not. For phone number, it is a non-indispensable data field, so it can not be
shared. In this case, the requested data are partially shared.
In the following Section, we will discuss the possible ways to estimate risks and benefits.
3.5 Risk-Benefit Estimation
Let us start to consider the benefit of an access request. This measure should estimate the
relevance of an access request AR in terms of advantages that the PDS owner might gain
if the request is granted. A first positive consequence of a granted access request is that
data consumer will be able to provide the service specified in the AR. This might impact
the data owner in several ways. The advantages gained by the provided service really
depends on the data owner, and, in particularly, on how much that service is needed by
the owner. As an example, benefits provided by heart monitoring services will be greatly
felt by a heart patient, more than an healthy person who does not need that service. As
such, we believe that benefits of an access request have to be measured in terms of data
owner necessity of the service requiring the data. Moreover, as introduced in Section 3.3,
data consumer might provide temporal offer that could impact the benefit estimation. This
brings to define the benefits from an access request as a function of the offer and service
need, as stated in the following.
Definition 3.5.1. Benefit. Given an access request AR, the benefit from AR is estimated
by a function taking as input the offer value AR.o and the service necessity of AR.st,
denoted as need st:
b AR ✏ benefit♣o, need st! (3.1)
where, benefit♣o, need st! is a function which has two variables, namely offer o, and service
necessity need st. If service necessity, need st and offer o are increased then the value of
the function benefit♣o, need st! is also increased proportionally. We assume that the value
of the function, benefit♣o, need st! is in the range of 0 to 1.
It is obvious that estimation of service necessity depends on the owner, as different
persons have different needs. Therefore, we strongly believe that we need to take into
account also data owners’ attitude regarding services need. At this purpose, a promising
approach we intend to follow is to learn this attitude from the data owner itself. Basi-
cally, we can consider two phases for estimating benefits. In the first phase, we can ask
for data owners’ feedback whether he/she needs the service or not. More precisely, we ask
data owners to get necessity judgments for each service type and purpose and use these
feedbacks as training data. In the second phase, the learning model learns automatically
to estimate service’s necessity of the upcoming services from PDS using the collected ne-
cessity judgments (training data set). Several machine learning tools (e.g., [21, 120]) are
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available for this purpose, that we plan to use for predicting the judgment of data owner
service necessity, need st. The other element of benefit♣o, need st! is offer o which may
be expressed by data consumers in their access request. Thus, we can measure benefit of
data owner regarding an access request using these two values.
Let us now consider the risk estimation. For this, several approaches can be followed, as
literature has deeply investigated the problem of risk estimation. As an example, there are
a number of research already accomplished to find out the risk [2,50,53,99] in the context
of social-media and access control. When dealing with risk of the release of personal data,
we have to consider some interesting aspects. The first is that, similarly to other web
service scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, e-business, etc), data consumer reputation might play
a relevant role in estimating the risk. Under the assumption that the more trusted is the
data consumer, the less is the risk, we can rely on work on trust/reputation estimation
to measure the risk. As an example, we could exploit proposal in [83], which measures
the trust value of data consumers. In addition to data consumer, another dimension we
might consider for risk estimation is given by the data requested by the access request.
Definitely, more confidential is the data more risky is the access. For this reason, we see
risk estimation as a function depending on data consumer and requested data.
Definition 3.5.2. Risk. Given an access request AR, risk is a function of data consumer
AR.DC and the requested data AR.d in the access request:
r AR ✏ risk♣d,DC! (3.2)
where, risk♣d,DC! is a function of two variables, data confidentiality d, and data con-
sumer’s reputation DC. Here, the value of risk♣d,DC! is decreased as data consumer’s
reputation DC is increased, whereas the value of risk♣d,DC! is increased as data confi-
dentiality d is also increased. We assume that the value of the function, risk♣d,DC! is
from 0 to 1.
Example 3.5.1. In Example 3, data consumer eBay provides service e-commerce and
submits an access request to data owner u’s PDS. In this case, to measure the benefits
regarding this access request, we need to concentrate on the necessity judgment of data
owner u and the offer value regarding e-commerce service provided by eBay. We assume
that our system collects sufficient training data regarding this service type. It means that
it gets a sufficient level of feedbacks from data owner u about e-commerce. Then using
machine learning techniques, we can predict the value of service necessity need st precisely.
Finally, using benefit(o, need st) function, we can measure the benefits for which the data
owner u would like to take the service by sharing his/her data fields
✥
(name, home number,
street name, postal code, country, phone number), (card type, card number, expiry
date, card owner, email)
✭
with data consumer eBay for purposes
✥
delivery, payment
✭
.
On the other hand, the data owner u might be anxious regarding his/her privacy threads
for sharing these data fields with the data consumer eBay. We can take the trust value of
eBay and the confidentiality of
✥
(name, home number, street name, postal code, country,
phone number), (card type, card number, expiry date, card owner, email)
✭
into account
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to measure risk value. After measuring risk and benefit values, our system compares these
two values for taking decision whether the requested data fields are (partially) shared with
eBay or not.5
3.6 Chapter summary
This chapter presents a model that efficiently organized the personal data into PDS based
on data confidentiality for the management of user privacy preferences, allowing data re-
leasing with third parties based on risk-benefit assessment. Since privacy preferences is a
user subjective matter, thus we introduced the idea of enforcing the authorization privacy
policy by using two metrics: risk and benefit. We measured these two values taking into
account different dimensions of data owners’ perspectives. Furthermore, we plan to im-
plement a prototype of our privacy-aware PDS and test it in different real world scenarios
using machine learning approaches.
5Although, according to our strategies, we do not measure the risk and benefit for all kind of requested
data fields.
Chapter 4
Privacy learning models for PDS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we make a first step that consider the issue of helping users in protecting
their PDS data by showing how machine learning tools, which have been extensively used
in the literature for many different learning tasks [49, 112, 113], can be used to learn how
to answer to future third party data requests, by exploiting user feedback on a training
dataset. In particular, the proposed privacy preference learning approach has been designed
by considering different driving dimensions, derived from a typical data access request
(e.g., intended purpose of usage, service type requiring the data, data consumer, etc.). In
selecting the learning approach, we have considered that these dimensions might have a
different weight in the decision process of each single individual. More precisely, we wanted
to explore if correlations among dimensions impact the decision process of individuals in
releasing their data. As such, we have experimentally tested different learning algorithms,
namely single-view [23], multi-view [111], and ensemble learning [79], to see which one
fits better in our scenario. Moreover, we carried out several experiments to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed learning approaches in capturing users’ preferences regarding
privacy-preserving data release. At this purpose, we developed a web application through
which evaluators were able to: (1) label a training dataset of access requests to PDS data,
and (2) give their feedback on access decisions (i.e., grant/deny) suggested by the system
for new access requests. We have tested the developed techniques through two different
groups of evaluators. First, we considered a group of students from two universities from
Italy and Bangladesh. Then, we used a crowd-sourcing platform to have a bigger and more
heterogeneous dataset. The obtained results show that around 79.08% of university based
evaluators and 79.24% of crowd-sourcing based evaluators are satisfied with the decisions
suggested by the system. As discussed in Section 4.4, the ensemble learning approach
returns the best accuracy, which confirms that decision process of individuals in releasing
their data takes in consideration correlations among dimensions rather than their simple
values.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4, recently a learning approach for the suggestion
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of personalized privacy settings in a similar context has been proposed [75]. However, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the first showing that correlations among dimensions of
an access request impact individual decisions process.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of our
proposal. Section 4.3 presents a summary of the machine learning approaches we use,
whereas, Section 4.4 illustrates the experimental results.
4.2 Overall architecture
Our goal is to design a privacy-aware PDS able to automatically answer to service provider
requests, by, at the same time, enforcing PDS owner preferences on how personal data have
to be released and used. To achieve this goal, we exploit machine learning to build classifiers
to predict whether a new access request has to be granted or denied. The literature offers
several learning algorithms that we can use [23] to this purpose. In selecting the best fitting
one, we have to take into account all the dimensions characterizing the PDS scenario. The
first relevant aspect is that data owner’s aptitude towards privacy, i.e., how his/her personal
data should be processed and managed, is subjective by nature. Indeed, it is matter of fact
that different individuals might have different privacy preferences w.r.t. the usage of their
data. To cope with this subjective aspect, we cast our attention on learning algorithms
that take into account user feedback (i.e., supervised learning approaches). These feedback
are in general used to create a training dataset on which algorithms build the classifiers.
In our setting, learning is based on access requests (see Figure 6.2). The learned models
are then used to answer future access requests generated by service provider, using the
automatic evaluation module.
We model an access request in such a way that it conveys the most important infor-
mation that let individuals take conscious privacy-aware decisions on whether they want
to release their personal data to the requesting party as defined in 3.3.3. According to
the definition, besides the requested data and the access purposes, which state the reason
why data are requested, an access request contains the type of the requesting services (e.g.,
medical, social, bank services) and an indication of the benefits the user can achieve by re-
leasing his/her data. Indeed, already in the 90’s Alan Westin showed in his/her study [102]
that the majority of people can be regarded as privacy pragmatics, that is, individuals who
weigh potential pros and cons case by case and then decide whether to share information
or not. We model benefits in terms of temporal offers.
The training dataset is therefore created asking to PDS owners to express a judgment
(label) for each access request in the set. This judgment represents his/her personal opinion
on whether the access request should be granted, denied, or whether no decision can be
taken (i.e., corresponding to labels: yes, no, maybe). The set of access requests AR
together with the assigned labels, LAR, form the labeled training set. However, requiring
a PDS owner to label huge amount of access requests would negatively impact the usability
and acceptance of our solution. Thus, to reduce the owner efforts, we focus on semi-
supervised learning algorithms, which have the advantage of achieving a good accuracy
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Figure 4.1: Privacy-aware PDS
with a small labeled training set [29, 119]. Semi-supervised learning leverages on both
labeled and unlabeled data for the learning tasks [115]. The details of the learning process
are given in the next section.
4.3 Learning approaches
Among the available learning approaches, we decided to consider semi-supervised algo-
rithms so as to reduce the user burden on getting training dataset. In Section 4.4, we show
that these algorithms provide a better accuracy compared to supervised learning (i.e.,
SVM) even with a small training dataset. Moreover, in choosing the best semi-supervised
algorithm(s) for our scenario, we have kept into account that we expect that individuals give
different relevance to each field of the AR (e.g., data consumer, purpose, requested data,
etc.). As an example, a user might be more conservative in his/her decisions when dealing
with high-sensitive information (e.g., credit card). It is also reasonable to expect that user
decisions might be impacted by a combination of different AR’s fields. As an example,
users with conservative decisions for high-sensitive information (e.g., credit card) might
be more prone to data release if data consumers have an high reputation or the returned
benefits are relevant (e.g., benefits in terms of service type and/or temporal offer).
In order to keep all these possibilities into account, in this chapter, we focus on three
semi-supervised algorithms, namely single-view, multi-view, and ensemble. As it will be
described in what follows, the first approach considers the AR as it is, thus building the
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classifier on the whole set of AR fields all together. The single-view approach has the
advantage of being efficient in terms of the time needed for building the classifier, however,
it does not exploit possible correlations that may exist among the AR fields. For this reason,
we test two additional approaches. In the multi-view approach, we consider two disjoint
views of AR fields (i.e., a view on AR fields about the requested data and one containing
AR fields describing how data are used), and we build two classifiers. In contrast, the aim
of the last approach is to consider each AR field separately and build a classifier for each of
them. The final prediction is then taken by combining predictions of each single classifier.
In proposing these three approaches, we leverage on semi-supervised learning with
generative models [119]. The basic idea of this approach is to estimate the distribution
of the probability of items (i.e., access requests) to belong to each class (e.g., yes, no,
maybe). Indeed, since in our scenario classes of labeled access requests are created by data
owners according to their privacy preferences, we expect to have well clustered data, that
is, to have probability distributions with well defined forms. Under this assumption, it
has been shown that generative models perform better than other semi-supervised learning
approaches [119]. As we describe in the following, among generative models we select the
Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [19].
In the following, we first provide details on single-view (aka EM) approach, then we
will discuss the multi-view approach (i.e., co-EM algorithm [76]) and, finally, the ensemble
approach [36,88].
4.3.1 Single-view: EM Algorithm
According to this approach, all item features are used together in the learning procedure.
This implies considering each access request as a single item. As described above, we exploit
semi-supervised learning with generative models, where each probability distribution is
parametrized by a vector Θ. In particular, we exploit the EM algorithm, which iteratively
estimates Θ for each distribution, so as to optimize the maximum likelihood [53]. To
this purpose, the EM algorithm alternates two steps: an expectation (E) step, where it
computes the maximum likelihood estimation for Θ, quantified by the log-likelihood of all
the items, based on the current estimation for Θ parameters; and a maximization (M)
step, where the algorithm updates Θ to maximize the likelihood. Due to space limitations,
we do not provide details on the statistical model behind EM, by referring the interested
reader to [13, 21].
As depicted in Algorithm 2, in the first iteration the EM algorithm assigns random
positive values to Θ parameters (line 4) and evaluates the initial value of the log likelihood
L♣Θ! (line 5). In the expectation step, it calculates the membership probability for each
item (i.e., access request) in each class (i.e., yes, no, maybe). The algorithm then assigns
to each class a set of access requests that, based on their feature values (i.e., access request
fields), most likely belong to that class (i.e., that most likely have to be denied, granted or
no decision can be taken) (line 7). Then, for each class, parameters are optimized based on
the current membership probability in the maximization step (line 8). The expectation and
maximization phases are iterated until log-likelihood does not change (i.e., the difference
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Algorithm 2 EM(dataset)
1: Input: dataset, a set of items;
2: Output: Θ parameters values;
3: Let convergence be initialized to false
4: Let Θ be initialized with random positive numbers
5: Calculate the value of L♣Θ!old
6: while convergence==false do
7: E-Step: Estimate likelihood on dataset based on Θ parameters values
8: M-Step: update Θ parameters values
9: Calculate log-likelihood L♣Θ!
10: if ⑤L♣Θ!old - L♣Θ!⑤ ↕ ǫ) then
11: convergence=true
12: else
13: L♣Θ!old=L♣Θ!
14: end if
15: end while
16: Return: Θ parameters values
between values of log-likelihood computed in two consequent iterations is less than a value
ǫ).
Algorithm 3 applies EM to our context. Note that, applying EM for semi-supervised
learning implies to first execute EM on labeled data to estimate the Θ parameters using
only labeled data, i.e., LAR (see line 4). The obtained Θ parameters are then updated
and used as values for another EM execution over the whole dataset consisting of labeled
and unlabeled UAR data (lines 6 - 16).
Once the semi-supervised EM algorithm has been trained, the returned Θ parameters
values are used to classify each new access request AR✶ submitted to PDS. As presented in
Algorithm 4, the label returned for AR✶ is the one associated with the highest membership
probability.
4.3.2 Multi-view (Co-EM) learning approach
Multi-view splits item features in the training dataset into two disjoint views, so as to build
a distinct classifier on each view [111].1 Each classifier is used to classify the unlabeled
data, which are then used to co-train the other classifier. That is, each classifier is retrained
again using, in addition to the initial training set, also some items labeled by the other
classifier. Co-training brings benefits in terms of a more efficient usage of unlabeled items
and an increased accuracy of the resulting classifiers [11, 16].
To apply multi-view in our scenario, we split AR fields into two disjoint views. The
first view, named view1, contains only the data specified in the access request (e.g, d0
1It has been shown that the approach works well even if the two views are not disjoint [22].
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Algorithm 3 Single view(LAR,UAR)
1: Input: LAR, the set of labeled access requests; UAR, the set of unlabeled access
requests;
2: Output: Θ parameters values;
3: Let convergence be initialized to false
4: Θ=EM(LAR)
5: Calculate L♣Θ!old
6: Let DataSet= LAR❨ UAR
7: while convergence==false do
8: E-Step: Estimate likehood on Dataset based on Θ parameter values
9: M-Step: update Θ parameter values
10: Calculate log-likelihood L♣Θ!
11: if ⑤L♣Θ!old - L♣Θ!⑤ ↕ ǫ) then
12: convergence=true
13: else
14: L♣Θ!old=L♣Θ!
15: end if
16: end while
17: Return: Θ parameters values
Algorithm 4 Evaluate Single view(AR✶,Θ)
1: Input: AR✶, a new access request; Θ, the parameters returned by EM(LAR,UAR);
2: Output: label for AR✶;
3: Let PAR✶♣Y es! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as YES, computed using Θ
4: Let PAR✶♣No! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as NO, computed using Θ
5: Let PAR✶♣Maybe! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as Maybe, computed
using Θ
6: Return: the label corresponding to max(PAR✶♣Y es!,PAR✶♣No!,PAR✶♣Maybe!)
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field, see Definition 3.3.3). We define a view with this information only as we believe that
data owner’s decision on granting/denying an access request is greatly impacted by what
the service provider is trying to access. In addition to the required data, another relevant
information from the access request is how and by whom the data is used. As such, we
create a second view, named view2, with the remaining access request fields, that is, the
name of data consumer DC, the service type st, the purpose of usage p, and the offer o,
which well describe by whom and how (for which purpose and for which service type) data
are used.
Example 4.3.1. Let us consider an access request AR =(eBay, Online Shopping, {name,
home number, street number, postal code, state name, credit card number, credit card ex-
piry date, credit card security code, credit card type, country, email}, {delivery, payment},
45%). According to our strategy, view1=(name, home number, street number, postal code,
state name, credit card number, credit card expiry date, credit card security code, credit
card type, country, email), whereas view2=(eBay, Online Shopping, {delivery, payment},
45%).
In this chapter, we use the co-EM (multi-view) semi-supervised learning algorithm
[76], which combines the concept of co-training and Expectation-Maximization algorithm.
Algorithm 5 describes all the performed steps.
Initially co-EM assigns positive values to Θ parameters to train a classifier on view1
(line 7), using only the labeled dataset (i.e., LARview1). Then, a classifier uses the labeled
dataset of view2 (i.e., LARview2) and labeled items assigned by view1 classifier (i.e., LUAR1)
for reassigning the appropriate label to unlabeled items (line 11). In the expectation step
(line 13 ), the membership probability for each item is calculated for each class (i.e., yes,
no, maybe) and then, for each class, the parameters are optimized, based on the current
membership probability in the maximization step (line 14), similarly to the single-view
approach. Then, the view1 classifier uses the labeled dataset of view1 (i.e., LARview1) and
labeled items (i.e., LUAR2) assigned by view2 classifier for reassigning the appropriate label
to unlabeled items (line 18). In the expectation step (line 20), the membership probability
for each item is calculated for each class, whereas in the maximization step (line 21),
the parameters are updated for maximizing the membership probability. The expectation
and maximization steps for each view are iteratively executed until log-likelihood does not
change.
Finally, a label is assigned to all items (i.e., access requests) by combining the mem-
bership probability for each class (i.e., yes, no, maybe) of view1 and view2 classifier.
Once the co-EM algorithm has been trained, the returned Θcom parameters values are
used to classify each new access request AR✶ submitted to PDS. As presented in Algorithm
6, the label returned for AR✶ is the one associated with the highest membership probability.
4.3.3 Ensemble learning approach
In this approach, we take into account that each element of an access request carries
valuable information to data owners to take the final decision on data release. Moreover, we
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Algorithm 5 co-EM(LAR,UAR)
1: Input: LAR, the set of labeled access requests; UAR, the set of unlabeled access
requests;
2: Output: Θcom parameters values;
3: Let convergence be initialized to false
4: Let LARview1 be the projection of LAR on d0
5: Let LARview2 be the projection of LAR on (DC,p,st,o)
6: DataSet = LAR❨ UAR
7: Θview1=EM(LARview1)
8: while convergence==false do
9: Let LUAR1 be the labels assigned to UAR computed using Θview1 parameters
10: Let Datasetview2= LARview2 ❨ LUAR1
11: Let Θview2=EM(Datasetview2)
12: Calculate L♣Θview2"old
13: E-Step: Estimate likehood on Dataset based on Θview2 parameters values
14: M-Step: Update Θview2 parameters values
15: Calculate log-likelihood L♣Θview2"
16: Let LUAR2 be the labels assigned to UAR computed using Θview2 parameters
17: Let Datasetview1= LARview1 ❨ LUAR2
18: Let Θview1=EM(Datasetview1)
19: Calculate L♣Θview1"old
20: E-Step: Estimate likehood on Dataset based on Θview1 parameters values
21: M-Step: Update Θview1 parameters values
22: Calculate log-likelihood L♣Θview1"
23: if ♣⑤L♣Θview2"old - L♣Θview2"⑤ ↕ ǫ" ❫ ♣⑤L♣Θview1"old- L♣Θview1"⑤ ↕ ǫ) then
24: convergence=true
25: end if
26: end while
27: Let Θcom be the combination of Θview1 and Θview2 parameters values
28: Return: Θcom
Algorithm 6 Multi view(AR✶,Θcom)
1: Input: AR✶, a new access request; Θcom, the parameters returned by co-
EM(LAR,UAR);
2: Output: label for AR✶;
3: Let PAR✶♣Y es" be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as YES, computed using
Θcom
4: Let PAR✶♣No" be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as NO, computed using Θcom
5: Let PAR✶♣Maybe" be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as Maybe, computed
using Θcom
6: Return: the label corresponding to max(PAR✶♣Y es",PAR✶♣No",PAR✶♣Maybe")
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cast our attention on the relationships between a given access request field and other access
request components. Indeed, as an example we believe it is relevant to learn aptitudes of
owners in accepting/denying an access, based on the correlation between the requested data
d0 and the requesting data consumer DC. Also the relationship between requested data
and intended purpose might have a relevant role in the decision. To take these connections
into account, we build a distinct classifier on the projection of the labeled training set on
each pair of fields of an access request (e.g., (d0, DC), (d0, p), etc.).
Table 4.1: Relationships among access request fields used to build the classifiers
AR field Relationships
Requested data (d0,DC), (d0,p),(d0, st), (d0, o)
Intended Purpose (p,DC),(p,st),(p,o)
Service type (st,DC), (st,o)
Offer (o,DC)
Actually, we do not consider all possible correlations among access request fields, but
only those represented in Table 4.1, where we avoid repeated correlations.
The obtained classifiers are then combined together to predict labels for new access
requests. At this purpose, we exploit ensemble learning [88, 118]. This approach is a
learning technique where multiple learning classifiers are combined to solve a particular
computational problem [79]. Generally, ensemble learning is used to improve the prediction
or minimize the error, by combining the individual decision of each classifier.
Algorithm 7 Ensemble(LAR, UAR)
1: Input: LAR, the set of labeled access requests; UAR, the set of unlabeled access
requests;
2: Output: Θensemble parameters values;
3: Let Rel be the set of pairs (m,n), where m and n are AR fields
4: for X  Rel do
5: Let LARX be the projection of X on LAR
6: Let UARX be the projection of X on UAR
7: ΘX=EM♣LARX ❨ UARX)
8: Θensemble= Θensemble ❨ΘX
9: end for
10: Return: Θensemble;
As illustrated by Algorithm 7, we exploit EM algorithm to build a classifier for each
combination of AR fields. Once the classifiers have been built, given a new access request
AR✶, we identify to which class (label) AR✶ most likely belongs to by using the bagging
method [79]. Bagging is an effective method for ensemble learning, where the final label is
assigned by computing the average of membership probabilities returned by the obtained
classifiers (see lines 39 - 42 in Algorithm 8).
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Algorithm 8 Evaluate Ensemble view(AR✶,Θensemble)
1: Input: AR✶, a new access request; Θesemble, the parameters returned by
Ensemble(LAR,UAR);
2: Output: label for AR✶;
3: Let PAR✶♣Y es!, PAR✶♣No!, PAR✶♣Maybe! be initialized to 0
4: for θ " Θesemble do
5: Let P θAR✶♣Y es! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as Yes, computed using θ
6: Let P θAR✶♣No! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as No, computed using θ
7: Let P θAR✶♣Maybe! be the probability for AR
✶ of being labeled as Maybe, computed
using θ
8: PAR✶♣Y es! = PAR✶♣Y es! # P
θ
AR✶♣Y es!
9: PAR✶♣No! = PAR✶♣No! # P
θ
AR✶♣No!
10: PAR✶♣Maybe!= PAR✶♣Maybe! # P
θ
AR✶♣Maybe!
11: end for
12: PAR✶♣Y es!= PAR✶♣Y es!④⑤Θensemble⑤
13: PAR✶♣No!= PAR✶♣No!④⑤Θensemble⑤
14: PAR✶♣Maybe!= PAR✶♣Maybe!④⑤Θensemble⑤
15: Return: The label corresponding to max(PAR✶♣Y es!,PAR✶♣No!,PAR✶♣Maybe!)
4.4 Experiments
We carried out several experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed learning
approaches in capturing users’ preferences regarding a privacy-preserving data release.
To evaluate if a classifier has correctly labeled a new access request, we need to ask
a judgment to the user that labeled the training dataset used by the classifier. To this
purpose, we set up an experiment that exploits a group of evaluators. In particular, we
developed a web application through which evaluators label a training dataset of access
requests (i.e., learning phase) and give their feedback on labels associated by the system
to new access requests (i.e., the testing phase). More precisely, during the learning phase
participants are asked to associate a decision (yes, no, maybe) with 40 access requests. As
depicted in Figure 4.2, this is done by posing a question where all access request fields are
highlighted. Once this phase has been concluded, for each evaluator, the collected training
dataset is elaborated by the learning algorithms illustrated in Section 4.3. Algorithms have
been implemented exploiting the R platform [15]. In the testing phase, the web application
selects 21 new access requests, generates the corresponding labels using the single-view,
multi-view, and ensemble classifiers obtained over the trained dataset. Finally, as shown
in Figure 4.3, the web application asks the evaluators whether they are satisfied with the
system generated label (i.e., the access decision). The evaluator can answer with yes, no,
or maybe.
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY LEARNING MODELS FOR PDS 45
Figure 4.2: Learning phase
Figure 4.3: Testing phase
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4.4.1 Settings
Access requests dataset. We consider access requests consist of five elements as defined
in 3.3.3, namely, data consumer DC, requested data d, purpose p, service type st, offer value
o. In order to generate the dataset of access requests, we have first generated possible values
for each access request field. We assume that each possible combination of these values
can represent an access request. However, to make our dataset realistic, we have defined
4 service types (i.e., Online Shopping, Banking, Healthcare, eGovernment), 15 purposes
(among which: treatment, diagnostic, eTicket airline, money transfer, direct marketing, job
etc.), 50 consumers of different types (e.g., eBay, ItaliaRail, Hospitals, etc.), 35 different
data types to be required (e.g., name, home number, disease name, date of birth, weight,
email, etc.), and measured the offer as a value in the range from 0 to 100%. Using these
values, we create new access requests by first randomly select a value for each field and
then by checking the consistency of the obtained access requests, in order to remove those
field combinations that are not semantically meaningful (e.g., an access request for online
shopping service type with treatment purpose). Moreover, we measure how much time a
user devotes to give feedback on an access request. If it is less than a desirable time (i.e.,
user did not read the access request carefully) then the user is removed from the task. The
obtained dataset contains 290 access requests.
Evaluator groups. We use two different groups of evaluators for better understanding
the performance of our approach. We exploit the same dataset for both the groups of
evaluators.
University-based evaluators: we invite undergraduate students studying in computer
science for testing the performance of our proposed privacy preference framework. To
do so, we invite them by sending email. We consider 30 students: 11 students from the
University of Insubria, Italy, and 19 students from Islamic University, Bangladesh. Students
participated in the evaluation using the above described web application.
Crowd-sourcing based evaluators: we exploit the Microworker crowd-sourcing platform2
for the enrollment of additional participants (called workers) of different nationalities, ages,
and educational levels. At this purpose, we select only the workers with the best rating
according to the Microworker platform, with the results of 220 evaluators. Once the job
has been accepted, each worker has been redirected to our web application to conduct both
learning and testing phases.
Metrics. In order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed learning approaches, we
make use of conventional measures. In particular, since we have classes with 3 labels (yes,
no, maybe), we exploit a 3X3 confusion matrix, see Table 4.2, representing the adopted
notations. More precisely, column of the matrix represents the predicted value for a class,
row represents a possible actual value, and an element identified by row and column specifies
the type of error, if any, in labeling an item whose real value is specified in the row with the
label corresponding to the column. From the confusion matrix, we define the evaluation
metrics given in Table 4.3.
2https://www.microworkers.com
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY LEARNING MODELS FOR PDS 47
Table 4.2: Confusion matrix
Predicted Predicted Predicted
value: Yes value: No value: Maybe
Actual value: Yes TPYes EYes, No EYes, Maybe
Actual value: No ENo, Yes TPNo ENo, Maybe
Actual value: Maybe EMaybe, Yes EMaybe, No TPMaybe
Table 4.3: Metrics definition
Accuracy=TPYes+TPNo+TPMaybe/total number of samples
Precision Yes=TPYes/ TPYes+ENo, Yes+EMaybe, Yes
Precision No=TPNo/ TPNo+EYes, No+EMaybe, No
Precision Maybe=TPMaybe/ TPMaybe+EYes, Maybe+ENo,Maybe
Recall Yes=TPYes/ TPYes+EYes, No+EYes, Maybe
Recall No=TPNo/ TPNo+ENo, Yes+ENo, Maybe
Recall Maybe=TPMaybe/ TPMaybe+EMaybe, Yes+EMaybe, No
F1C=2* (PrecisionC*RecallC)/(PrecisionC+RecallC),
where C  {Yes, Maybe, No}
4.4.2 Accuracy
In the first experiment, we provide a comparison of accuracy obtained by different classi-
fiers. More precisely, we first make a comparison between a semi-supervised soft-clustering
method (i.e., EM) against a hard-clustering approach (i.e., SVM), so as to show that semi-
supervised approaches have a good accuracy even with a reduced training set. As second
experiment, we measure and compare the accuracy of the proposed classifiers, namely,
single-view, multi-view, and ensemble.
Supervised hard-clustering vs. Semi-supervised soft-clustering. As our aim is
to reduce the user burden on getting training dataset, in selecting the learning algorithm we
focused on semi-supervised EM learning approach. Nevertheless, we check the performance
of hard clustering supervised machine learning techniques to make a comparison. At this
purpose, we compare the accuracy of EM single-view against SVM. Results are shown in
Figure 4.4. The reported results have been computed by training SVM and EM single-view
over 20 access requests of the training set and evaluating the resulting classifiers over the
remaining 20 access requests.
The results show that when we consider small amount of training dataset, such as 20
access requests, then the performance of single-view EM is degraded compared with the 40
access requests training dataset (see in Figure 4.5). Moreover, the accuracy level of SVM
is less than the one of EM single-view, because SVM needs bigger training datasets for
predicting accurate results. This motivates us to use soft clustering techniques rather than
hard clustering. Based on this values, we considered for further experiments a training
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Figure 4.4: Accuracy of 3-classes EM single-view vs. 3-classes SVM single-view
dataset of 40 questions, to trade-off between users burden and good prediction accuracy.
Single-view, Multi-view, and Ensemble accuracy. At this purpose, we use the
obtained classifiers to (re)-label access requests in the training dataset LAR, so as to com-
pute the true positive values (i.e., TPyes,TPNo,TPMaybe). As such, we define the accuracy
as a ratio of the total number of true positives to the total number of samples. As shown in
Figure 4.5, around 74.11% and 75.71% of the training dataset of university based evalua-
tors and crowd-sourcing based evaluators are correctly labeled by the ensemble algorithm,
respectively, whereas around 71.07% and 72.27% of the training dataset of university based
evaluators and crowd-sourcing-based evaluators are correctly labeled by EM (single-view),
whereas 65.71% and 67.69% are correctly labeled by Co-EM(multi-view) algorithm, re-
spectively. Therefore, in this experiment we can see that the performance of the ensemble
learning approach is better than single-view and multi-view approaches.
4.4.3 Satisfaction level
This experiment is based on feedback received by evaluators during the testing phase. We
recall that in this phase, the web application shows to evaluators a set of access requests
with the corresponding decisions (labels), and asks to them if they are satisfied by the
taken system decision. In particular, we consider 24 access requests. Among them, 21 ac-
cess requests have been generated by the classifiers obtained by the three proposed learning
approaches (7 access access requests for each approach, randomly presented to the eval-
uators). The remaining 3 access requests are taken from the set of access requests that
the evaluators have labelled during the first phase. These are used for checking the consis-
tency of evaluators judgments, and thus making some considerations on the quality of the
evaluators (see the discussion in the next section). As shown in Figure 4.6, around 79.08%
of university based evaluators and 79.24% of crowd-sourcing based evaluators are satisfied
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Figure 4.5: Accuracy of single-view, ensemble, and multi-view
with the decisions taken using the ensemble learning classifier, whereas around 74.49%
and 75.17% are fine with the decisions taken using single-view classifiers, and 72.45% and
72.25% with decisions taken by using Co-EM. This experiment further confirms that all
approaches obtain a good satisfaction level, but again ensemble outperforms the others.
This shows that relationships among elements of an access request play a relevant role in
the data owner decision of releasing personal data.
4.4.4 Evaluator quality
As the proposed system depends on owner input on the training dataset, we are interested
to investigate how a badly labelled training set impacts the final satisfaction level. At this
purpose, we make use of the three access requests that, as mentioned earlier, are taken from
the set of access requests that evaluators have labelled during the first phase. In particular,
in presenting these access requests during the testing phase, the web application shows, as
taken decision, the same label entered by the evaluator during the first phase. Based on
the satisfaction level the evaluator assigns to this label, we can judge whether the evaluator
is consistent or not in his/her decisions, which gives us a measure of the quality of his/her
jobs. We consider an evaluator as consistent if he/she is satisfied by the shown taken
decisions for all the three access requests.
Figure 4.7 presents the comparative analysis of the satisfaction level for consistent and
inconsistent evaluators. The figure shows that the satisfaction level of consistent users is
greater than the satisfaction level of inconsistent users. However, even in the worst case,
about 68% of inconsistent evaluators are satisfied by the taken decisions.
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Figure 4.6: Evaluators satisfaction level
Figure 4.7: Satisfaction level of consistent and inconsistent evaluators
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Table 4.4: Comparison of single-view, ensemble, and multi-view for the training dataset
Single-view Ensemble Multi-view
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
University based evaluators
Precision 77.80 % 66.75% 50.93% 84.92% 67.53% 47.18% 71.53% 63.40% 47.88%
Recall 77.93 % 71.55% 46.15% 76.14% 75.50% 58.26% 74.56% 65.25% 38.18%
F1 77.86 % 69.07% 50.16% 80.29% 71.29% 52.14% 73.01% 64.31% 42.63%
Crowd-sourcing based evaluators
Precision 80.33 % 67.75% 52.50% 90.34% 66.08% 42.03% 76.95% 62.04% 45.69%
Recall 81.58 % 63.89% 54.72% 78.91% 71.02% 66.94% 78.67% 57.27% 48.24%
F1 80.95 % 65.76% 53.59% 84.24% 68.46% 51.63% 77.80% 59.56% 46.93%
Table 4.5: Comparison of single-view, ensemble, and multi-view for the testing dataset
Single-view Ensemble Multi-view
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
University based evaluators
Precision 73.95 % 78.85% 68.00% 83.47% 71.67% 73.33% 80.00% 70.83% 61.76%
Recall 88.89 % 51.25% 100% 85.59% 64.18% 100% 77.42% 62.20% 100%
F1 80.73 % 62.12% 80.95% 84.52% 67.72% 84.62% 78.69% 66.23% 76.36%
Crowd-sourcing based evaluators
Precision 84.79 % 66.67% 60.42% 81.82% 77.56% 64.63% 80.76% 64.86% 60.63%
Recall 83.72 % 53.69% 100% 91.51% 53.23% 100% 80.86% 50.62% 100%
F1 84.25 % 59.48% 75.32% 86.39% 63.13% 78.51% 80.81% 56.86% 75.49%
4.4.5 F1 Measure
We measure the F1 score for each class (yes, no, maybe) in the training dataset and testing
dataset, separately (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively). F1 score considers both the pre-
cision and the recall. The precision is the ratio of the number of correctly predicted items
(i.e.,access requests) to the total number of incorrectly predicted items. Whereas, recall is
the ratio of the number of correctly predicted items to the total number of relevant items.
Our analysis exhibits that ensemble learning works better than single-view and multi-view
approaches, as shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 for training and testing datasets, respectively.
From our analysis we observe that in the testing phase, users may agree/disagree on the
maybe decision taken by the system, but no one selects the option “maybe” against the
decision of yes and no taken by the system. Thus, the recall for “maybe” class is maxi-
mum in all the considered approaches. It means that participants are not confused when
evaluating the system decisions.
CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY LEARNING MODELS FOR PDS 52
Figure 4.8: Comparison of F1 score for single-view, ensemble, and multi-view for the
training dataset
Figure 4.9: Comparison of F1 score for single-view, ensemble, and multi-view for the
testing dataset
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4.5 Chapter summary
This chapter presented a privacy preference approach that regulating data release from
PDS with third party applications. This approach exploits machine learning tools (e.g.,
single-view, multi-view, and ensemble) that discloses the personal data whose release has
been explicitly learned from PDS owners previous feedbacks. We have extensively tested
our approaches by evaluators enrolled from the university environment, as well as through
a crowd-sourcing platform. The achieved experimental results show that the correlations
among the different dimensions of learning elements make the positive impact to learn users’
privacy preferences. Thus, ensemble learning approach provides better result over other
approaches. The main advantage of our approaches is that they can nicely be interoperable
with current solutions in different application domains.
Chapter 5
Privacy learning optimized models
for PDS
5.1 Introduction
The privacy preference learning models discussed in the Chapter 4 have used different semi-
supervised machine learning approaches for learning privacy preferences of PDS owners.
The idea is to find a learning algorithm that, after a training period by the PDS owner,
returns a classifier able to automatically decide if access requests submitted by third parties
are to be authorized or denied. In Chapter 4, we have shown that, among different semi-
supervised learning approaches, the one that better fits the considered scenario is ensemble
learning [37, 79]. Even though the identification of the learning approach is an essential
step, the design of a Privacy-aware Personal Data Storage (P-PDS), that is, a PDS able to
automatically take privacy-aware decisions on third parties access requests requires further
investigation. One critical aspect to consider is the usability of the system. As several
studies have shown, average users might have difficulties in properly setting potentially
complex privacy preferences [3, 63]. Even if semi-supervised techniques require less users’
effort, compared to manually setting privacy preferences, in order to obtain accurate results
they still require many interactions with PDS owners to collect a good training dataset.
To reduce the required user effort, in the current chapter, we leverage on active learning
(AL) [82] to minimize user burden for getting the training dataset by, at the same time,
achieving better accuracy in determining user privacy preferences. The main idea of active
learning is to select from the training dataset the most representative instances to be
labeled by users. Literature offers several methods driving the selection of these new
instances. The most commonly adopted method is uncertainty sampling [82]. According to
this approach, to be labeled by human annotators, active learning selects those instances
for which it is highly uncertain how to label them according to the preliminary built
model. As reported in Section 5.5, this improvement brings benefits in term of accuracy
and usability. Additionally, to further improve the performance of the system we define an
alternative uncertainty sampling strategy, which is based on the observation that, for taking
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a privacy-related decision, some fields of access requests (i.e., data consumer and type of
service requiring the data) are more informative than others. Thus, if a new access request
presents new values for these fields, the system push for a new training (i.e., asking data
owner a label for the access request). To enforce this behavior, we introduce a penalization
of the uncertainty measure based on the distance of the new access request w.r.t. the
access requests previously labeled by the P-PDS owner (we call this strategy history-based
active learning). As it will show in the experiments, history-based active learning shows
better results than AL in terms of user’s satisfaction. As a further improvement, in this
chapter, we propose a revised version of the ensemble learning algorithm proposed in the
Chapter 4, to enforce a more conservative approach w.r.t. users’ privacy. In particular, we
reconsider how ensemble learning handles decisions for access requests for which classifiers
return conflicting classes. In general, the final decision is taken selecting the class with
the highest aggregated probabilities. However, this presents the limit of not considering
users perspective, in that, it does not take into account which classifier is more relevant
for the considered user. To cope with this issue, we propose an alternative strategy for
aggregating the class labels returned by the classifiers. According to this approach, we
assign a personalized weight to each single classifier used in ensemble learning. We also
show how it is possible to learn these weights from the training dataset, thus without
the need of further input from the P-PDS owner. Experiments show that this approach
increases user’s satisfaction as well as the learning effectiveness.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview of our
proposal. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 present the proposed learning approaches, whereas Section
5.5 illustrates the experimental results.
5.2 Privacy-aware PDS (P-PDS)
In general, to build a classifier using a predictive learning model, it is essential to label
an initial set of instances, called the training dataset. However, it is matter of fact that
obtaining a sufficient number of labeled instances is time consuming and costly due to the
required human input [31]. On the other hand, the size and quality of the training dataset
impact the accuracy the classifier might reach. At this purpose, active learning (AL) [82]
may be exploited to reduce the size of the training dataset. The key idea of AL is to build
the training dataset by properly selecting a reduced number of instances from unlabeled
items, rather than randomly choosing them as done by traditional supervised learning
algorithms. This makes it possible to efficiently exploit unlabeled instances for developing
effective prediction models as well as to reduce the time and cost of labeling [20].
More precisely, the main idea of active learning is to first select very few instances for
being labeled by human and build on them a preliminary prediction model. After that,
AL exploits this preliminary model to select new instances from the training dataset to be
labeled to reinforce the model. Literature offers several methods driving the selection of
these new instances. The most commonly adopted method is uncertainty sampling [82].
According to this approach, AL selects those instances for which it is highly uncertain how
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY LEARNING OPTIMIZED MODELS FOR PDS 56
Figure 5.1: P-PDS architecture
to label them according to the preliminary built model, thus that require to be labeled by
human annotators.
Although AL greatly reduces human participation on labeling training datasets and
leads to good performance, researchers have further investigated how to combine active
learning with semi-supervised approaches [67, 72]. We recall that semi-supervised learn-
ing algorithms can learn from labeled and unlabeled data, as such AL can improve this
approach by properly selecting the most uncertain unlabeled data to be labeled, thus to
further reduce the cost of labeling. This nice benefit motivates us to adopt this strategy
and to design a privacy-aware PDS (P-PDS) that deploys the ensemble learning algorithm
proposed in Chapter 4 but following an active learning approach so as to minimize user
burden for getting the training dataset and, at the same time, to achieve excellent perfor-
mance to predict accurate classes for unlabeled data (aka, new access requests submitted
to the P-PDS).
As depicted in Figure 6.2, the proposed P-PDS selects a first small set of incoming access
requests (Figure 6.2.a) in order to create an initial training dataset, to be labeled by the
P-PDS owner, which is then used to build the preliminary learning model. Then, using this
preliminary model P-PDS measures the uncertainty of the newly arriving access requests
AR (Figure 6.2.b) and asks P-PDS owner to directly label AR only if its uncertainty level is
high (Figure 6.2.c). Otherwise, AR is immediately labeled by the semi-supervised ensemble
classifier using the preliminary learning model. In this way, AL can minimize user burden
by only labeling most uncertain access requests leading a good accuracy and making P-PDS
able to take decision even with a small training dataset.
Even if this improvement brings benefits in term of accuracy and usability, we believe
that it can be further extended so as to be more conservative w.r.t. P-PDS owner’s pri-
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vacy. This consideration arises from the following example. Let us consider these two
access requests: AR✶(Amazon, online shopping, mail address, credit card information, de-
livery and payment, 50%) and AR✷(MyAmazon, online shopping, mail address, credit card
information, delivery and payment, 50%), which are identical apart from the consumer.
Let also assume that AR✶ has been already labeled by the P-PDS owner. By adopting an
AL strategy, the P-PDS might consider AR✷ not to be labeled, as the uncertainty value
is low since only one field differs. However, in doing so, we would not consider that the
consumer field is too informative to not consider its variation. The issue is that AL does
not consider the semantics of AR’s fields, and their relevance in the P-PDS owner’s deci-
sion process. Indeed, a user might fully change his/her decision on an access request based
on the requesting data consumer (aka its reputation). Thus, we believe that it would be
relevant to give extra consideration to access requests coming from new data consumers. In
addition to this field, we also believe that service type is a key element with respect to data
owners’ perspective. In reality, granting/denying an access request deeply depends on the
need the individual has for that type of service. For instance, in case of health problems
some types of service (e.g., heart-beat monitoring) is not only needed but it is mandatory
for individual survival.
For this reason, when an access request comes from a new data consumer or with
a new service type, the P-PDS triggers the P-PDS owner for labeling the new request.
At this purpose, we decide to complement AL with additional strategies for triggering
the selection of new instances to be labeled. More precisely, we revise the strategy of
uncertainty sampling, traditionally adopted in AL to increase accuracy, so as to increase
the level of uncertainty based on values of data consumer and service type of the newly
arrived access request. As described in Section 5.3, this uncertainty adjustment is driven
by the distance between the value of data consumer/service type of the new access request
and the values of the corresponding elements in access requests already labeled by the
P-PDS owner. This solution traces the history of labeled access requests, as such we call
this model history-based active learning (see Section 5.3 for more details).
The second relevant new feature of P-PDS is related on how ensemble learning handles
decisions for access request having conflicting class. In general, in order to provide the final
decision for a new access request AR, ensemble computes the probabilities for each classes
(i.e., yes, no, maybe) using the Θensemble classifiers. Then it sums all probabilities associated
with a given class and selects, as final decision, the class with the highest probabilities.
As such, ensemble does not consider the class semantics, aka whether they are conflicting,
but it simply aggregates their probabilities. If this works in some application scenarios, in
our context it might represent a problem. For example, let us consider an access request
AR receiving the following classes: yes for Θ
♣st,d#, no for Θ♣st,o#, maybe for Θ♣DC,o#, maybe
for Θ
♣p,o#, yes for Θ♣DC,p# and so on. Suppose that, based on the obtained probabilities,
the ensemble approach returns the final class label yes for AR, even though the decisions
produced by the classifiers Θensemble are conflicting. However, this decision might not reflect
the correct opinion of P-PDS owner, as a P-PDS owner may have more interest for some
dimensions, say ♣st, o!, than for other dimensions, say ♣st, d!, ♣st, DC!, etc. Knowing about
this “preference” would let the system adjust the final decision, giving more relevance to
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the dimension user cares more. In contrast, in such a situation, traditional ensemble might
result in false positives/false negatives, as it is not able to catch user preferences in case of
conflicting scenarios.
To overcome this problem, we propose an alternative strategy for aggregating the class
labels returned by classifiers Θensemble. According to this approach, we assign a personalized
weight to each single classifier in Θensemble, to reflect its relevance in the user opinion. As
shown in Figure 6.2, we call this approach personalized semi-supervised ensemble learning
approach (see Section 5.4 for more details).
Adopting this solution implies that when a new access request AR arrives, the P-PDS
first collects the class values returned by Θensemble. If these are not conflicting, the P-PDS
exploits the traditional ensemble approach for computing the final decision, otherwise it
exploits personalized weights, as shown in Figure 6.2.
5.3 History-based Active Learning (HBAL)
As mentioned in Section 5.2, we propose to use AL but suggesting to increase the uncer-
tainty value of a newly arrived access request AR, based on its data consumer and service
type. The key idea is that more the data consumer/service type in AR is different from
data consumer/service type contained in access requests already labeled by the P-PDS
owner, more its uncertainty level should be increased.
In doing so, the first step is the definition of two metrics able to quantify the distance
between two service types/data consumers. In the following, we first introduce the distance
metric for service type, then we discuss the metric for data consumer. Finally, we describe
how we combine them to tune the AL uncertainty.
Service type distance. For this metric, we exploit semantic tools. In particular,
we exploit the OWL-S framework [65] that mainly uses three types of sub-ontologies for
semantically describing web services [64]. The first is the service profile sub-ontology, which
describes the service provided to clients by a web service. The second is the service process
sub-ontology to describe service functionalities and to specify how a client should interact
with the service to get its functionalities. Finally, the service grounding sub-ontology
describes how to invoke the web service. Among these three, the more relevant is the
service profile sub-ontology, which contains properties such as serviceName (i.e., name of
the service), textDescription (i.e., a brief description of the service). This latter includes
also the description of the data the service requires as input and any other information
the provider wants to include to describe the web service. In addition, the service profile
sub-ontology uses hasparameter property to identify whether a service is being inherited
by other services. By considering these relationships, it is possible to create an hierarchy
among service types. Utilizing this hierarchy, we have been able to build the service type
hierarchy, depicted in Figure 5.2.
Thus, exploiting this hierarchy we can measure the distance between two service types
st1 and st2, denoted as dST ♣!, as the number of edges in the path connecting the two leaves
corresponding to st1 and st2.
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Figure 5.2: Service-type ontology
Data Consumer distance. For measuring the distance between data consumers, we
assume that the system associates with each data consumer a profile consisting of a set
of attributes describing the entity organization. For simplicity, in this chapter we assume
this profile consists of the following attributes: business category (BC), describing the type
of the business the organization has; origin (O), stating the country where the entity is
based; and the founded year (FY). However, different profile attributes can be considered
as well.
Based on the profile, we measure the distance, denoted as dDC , between two data
consumers DC1 and DC2 as the average of the distances between each attribute in their
profiles. At this purpose, we exploit different distance metrics, depending on the nature of
the attributes. For instance, for numeric values, the distance is calculated as the normal-
ized Euclidean distance. For categorical attributes, we exploit the Jaccard similarity [48],
if attribute values are not hierarchical organized. In contrast, if e attribute values are
hierarchical organized, we can exploit existing distance measures defined for hierarchies
(e.g., [68]).1
Uncertainty tuning. Given a new access request AR the idea is to adjust the uncer-
tainty value associated with AR, based on values of its data consumer and service type,
more precisely based on their distances with respect to access requests already labeled by
1Other distance metrics can be used as well.
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Algorithm 9 History-based AL
Input: LAR, the set of labeled access requests;
UAR, the set of unlabeled access requests;
AR, the newly arrived access request;
Output: ΘensembleHBAL
1: Let SN be the number of labeled ARs required for building the preliminary model
2: if (⑤LAR⑤ ➔ SN) then
3: Ask P-PDS owner a label for AR
4: Insert AR and its label into LAR
5: else
6: Let Rel be the set of pairs (m, n), where m and n are AR fields
7: Let τ is the marginal threshold value among classes
8: UAR✶ ✏ ♣UAR❨ %AR&✉
9: ΘensembleHBAL=Ensemble♣LAR,UAR
✶
&
10: Zwyes ✏
1
⑤Rel⑤
➦
⑤Rel⑤
Z✏1 PZ♣Zyes⑤AR&
11: Zwno ✏
1
⑤Rel⑤
➦
⑤Rel⑤
Z✏1 PZ♣Zno⑤AR&
12: Zwmaybe ✏
1
⑤Rel⑤
➦
⑤Rel⑤
Z✏1 PZ♣Zmaybe⑤AR&
13: Let nearest.st be the service type with the shortest distance to AR.st
14: Let LARnearest.st ❸ LAR be the set of access requests having nearest.st as service
type
15: LetDCvalues be the set of data consumers specified in access requests in LARnearest.st
16: LetMostSimilar.DC be the data consumer in DCvalues having maximum similarity
with AR.DC
17: P ✏
dDC♣AR.DC,MostSimilar.DC&
1) dST ♣AR.st, nearest.st&
18: Zˆwyes ✏ P ✝ Zwyes
19: Zˆwno ✏ P ✝ Zwno
20: Zˆwmaybe ✏ P ✝ Zwmaybe
21: Let Rank be a vector initialized with { Zˆwyes ,Zˆwno ,Zˆwmaybe} values
22: Sort Rank elements in descending order
23: if ♣⑤Rank+1, ✁Rank+2,⑤ ↕ τ& then
24: Request P-PDS owner to provide a label for AR
25: Insert received label and AR into LAR
26: else
27: insert AR into UAR
28: Evaluate access request (UAR, ΘensembleHBAL)
29: end if
30: end if
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the P-PDS owner (i.e., the training dataset, denoted in what follows as LAR).
However, computing the distance between AR and each access request in the training
dataset might be too time consuming. To avoid this waste of computation, we consider
only the labeled access requests that offer the same (or similar) service type of the newly
arrived request AR. The underlying idea is that if two requests offer similar services also
the corresponding data consumers should present some similarities in their profiles (aka in
the business category field). If not, this might represent an anomaly that would be better
to be evaluated directly by the P-PDS owner, i.e., its uncertainty value should be tuned.
Thus, a first step is to retrieve those labeled access requests in LAR offering a service
type similar to the one in AR. In support of this selection, the system traces in the service-
type ontology tree those service types previously labeled by the P-PDS owner. More
precisely, the system marks a leaf in the tree if there exists at least an access request in the
training dataset that contains the value associated with that leaf node. Then, when a new
access request AR arrives, our model checks whether the leaf corresponding to its service
type is marked. If so, the distance dST ♣! is set to zero. Otherwise, the system measures
the distance among this unmarked leaf and all other marked leaves, representing service
types for which the P-PDS owner has expressed a label. Finally, among these distances,
our model selects those leaves with the shortest distance. We denote the selected service
type as nearest.st.2
Example 5.3.1. Let us consider, for instance, the service-type ontology described
in Figure 5.2, assuming that only leaves "Loan,Online shopping,Heart treatment✉
have been marked. Furthermore, let assume that Flight reservation is the
service-type associated with AR. The system computes the following distances:
dST ♣Flight reservation, Loan!=5, dST ♣Flight reservation,Online shopping!=3, and
dST ♣Flight reservation,Heart treatment!=5. Among these distances, our model selects
dST ♣Flight reservation,Online shopping!.
Exploiting the selected service types, the system retrieves the subset of access requests in
the training dataset, denoted as LARnearest.st, having as value of service type the one with
shortest distance with AR, aka nearest.st. Following the previous example, LARnearest.st
consists of all labeled access requests with the Online shopping service type. Then, the sys-
tem measures the distance between data consumer specified in AR and each data consumer
specified in the access requests in LARnearest.st. Among these distances, the system selects
the data consumer with the maximum similarity with AR.DC. Hereafter, the selected data
consumer is denoted as MostSimilar.DC.
Finally, to adjust AR’s uncertainty value we exploit both the distance with service
type nearest.st (i.e., dST ♣AR.st, nearest.st!), and the distance with the data consumer
MostSimilar.DC (i.e., dDC♣AR.DC,MostSimilar.DC!). In doing this, we exploit the
following formula to compute the penalization value P :
P ✏
dDC♣AR.DC,MostSimilar.DC!
1% dST ♣AR.st, nearest.st!
2For simplicity, in what follows we assume that there exists only one service type with the shortest
distance. Managing multiple service types with the shortest distance is an easy extension.
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where 0 ✏➔ P ➔✏ 1.
More precisely, this formula ensures that when AR contains a service type and a data
consumer whose values have been both already labeled by the P-PDS owner (i.e., dST ♣#=0
and dDC♣#=1), then the tuning value P is set to 1. As it will be explained after, this
implies that no penalization to the uncertainty value is applied, whereas P ➔ 1 implies a
penalization of the uncertainty value. The increase of the distance (i.e., increase of dST ♣#
and decrease of dDC♣#) implies smaller value of P (i.e., a greater penalization).
The pseudo code implementing HBAL is presented in Algorithm 9. The algorithm takes
as input LAR (i.e., set of labeled access requests), UAR (i.e., the set of unlabeled access
requests), AR (i.e., the newly arrived access request), and returns as output the updated
ΘensembleHBAL parameters values for each classifier.
According to the active learning approach, we first need to build a preliminary model
based on a small number of labeled instances, denoted as SN . As such, until the LAR
cardinality is less than SN , for every new access request Algorithm 9 simply asks the P-
PDS owner to label it and insert the obtained label into LAR (see lines 3-4 in Algorithm 9).
Once LAR is bigger enough, the arrival of a new access request will prompt the Algorithm
to compute the ΘensembleHBAL parameters (line 9). For doing so, for each dimension (i.e.,
Rel = (d0,DC), (d0,p),(d0, st), (d0, o), (p,DC),(p,st),(p,o), (st,DC), (st,o),(o,DC)}),
Algorithm 9 computes the classifiers’ parameters, ΘensembleHBAL , exploiting the Ensemble♣#
function (see Algorithm 7). Once the classifiers have been built, Algorithm 9 computes, for
each class (i.e., yes, no, maybe), the sum of probabilities that AR has this label according
to the dimensions in Rel (see lines 10-12).
The class probabilities computed in lines 10-12 are then penalized based on P value.
To compute this value, Algorithm 9 has to first retrieve the service type that is the most
similar to the one in AR (line 13), and, among the access requests in LARnearest.st, it
retrieves the data consumer which is most similar to the one in AR (lines 16). Once P has
been computed, AR probabilities are adjusted (lines 18- 20). Then, Algorithm 9 initializes
a vector Rank with values of these probabilities in descending order (lines 21-22). If the
two classes with smaller probabilities have a distance smaller than τ3 the system considers
AR as uncertain and requests the P-PDS owner to insert a new label for AR. Otherwise,
AR is inserted into the set of unlabeled access requests UAR.
5.4 Personalized History-based Active Learning (PHBAL)
As discussed in Section 5.2, we propose to change the way ensemble aggregates labels
returned by ΘensembleHBAL classifiers in case of conflict. More precisely, we say that an
access request has a conflicting decision if the returned labels are not within the same
class ( yes, no, or maybe). We recall that traditional ensemble approach does not make
a distinction for conflicting classes, by computing the final decision simply aggregating
3
In this setting, we assume the fixed uncertainty strategy [121]. It corresponds to label the instances for
which the certainty is below some fixed threshold τ .
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probabilities returned by classifiers. However, this does not take into account the semantics
associated with each decision (aka class label).
Indeed, a user might give more relevance to some class labels, and less to others (e.g.,
given more relevance to no than yes labels). These preferences should be considered in
resolving the conflicts. To take into account this, given AR we propose to adjust the
probabilities returned by the classifiers based on a set of weights measuring the relevance
the P-PDS owner gives to class labels. Here, the challenge is to properly set these weights.
At this purpose, we propose to learn them analyzing the training set LAR, that is, the
set of access requests directly labeled by P-PDS owners. In particular, we consider only
those access requests in LAR, denoted as LARconf , that would be considered conflicting if
analyzed by the classifiers (i.e., those access requests having labels not in the same class).
More formally, given an AR✶  LARconf , we denote with OLAR✶ the owner label specified
for AR✶, and with CLAR✶ the final computed label. The key idea is to find the set of weights
that if applied to probabilities returned by classifiers would result in a final label CLAR✶
that maximizes the accuracy, that is, with the smallest difference w.r.t OLAR✶ .
In order to learn more meaningful weights, we do not limit ourselves to simply consider
the three class labels returned by the classifiers (i.e., yes, no, maybe) as discussed in
Chapter 4. Indeed, since we are interested in measuring their relevance, we wish to take
into account also their strength. For this purpose, we exploit the value of covariance
in the probability distribution to categorize the class label of each classifier as strong,
moderate, and weak. More precisely, when a classifier assigns to an access request a class
label whose probability appears in the first deviation of the probability distribution, we
consider the class label for that classifier as strong (e.g., strongyes, strongno, strongmaybe).
Similarly, when a classifier assigns a class label for an access request whose probability
appears in the second and the third deviation of probability distribution, we consider this
class label as moderate (e.g., moderateyes,moderateno,moderatemaybe) and weak (e.g.,
weakyes, weakno, weakmaybe), respectively.
As an example, Figure 5.3 depicts the probability distribution of the yes class label
predicted by the classifier Θ
♣o,p" (i.e., for offer (o) vs purpose (p) dimension) over a training
dataset. X-axis represents the offer values, whereas Y-axis represents the purposes con-
verted into numerical values. More precisely, in Figure 5.3, the first, second and third circles
enclose access requests of the training dataset, whereas classifier Θ
♣o,p" returns the proba-
bilities for yes class label with values in the first, second, and third deviations, respectively
(i.e., strongyes, moderateyes, weakyes).
Considering the strength allows us to have 9 different class labels, hereafter called as
class strength. Thus, we find the set of weights to be applied to the classifiers, based on their
class strength. Note that, if classifier C1 ✏ ♣d0, o# and classifier C2 ✏ ♣st, o# return the
same class strength they will have the same weight. More precisely, to find these weights,
for each AR✶  LARconf , we iteratively set a random value for each weight, compute the
obtained decision (i.e., CLAR✶) and check it against user’s given label (i.e., OLAR✶). Among
all iterated random values, we select the ones that maximize the accuracy. Algorithm
10 illustrates how the P-PDS determines the weight for each class strength returned by
classifiers. It starts by computing the set W containing all possible combinations of values
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Figure 5.3: Class labels’s classification based on deviation
for the 9 weights, where each value is selected in the set {1,2,3,4,5} (see line 1). Then,
for each combination w  W and for each access request AR✶  LARconf Algorithm 10
does the following: it generates the 9 class strengths produced by classifiers ΘensembleHBAL
(line 4); it counts the occurrences of each class strength (lines 10- 27); it computes the
weighted sum of probabilities of the three main classes (yes, no, maybe), by applying the
iterated combination of weights w (lines 30- 32); and based on these personalized aggregated
probabilities Algorithm 10 takes a decision CLAR✶ for AR
✶ (lines 33-39).
This decision is then compared to the one assigned by the P-PDS owner, that is OLAR✶ .
If the accuracy obtained using the computed weights w is higher or equal to the ones
achieved by previous weights, Algorithm 10 stores w into weight and proceeds to elaborate
another conflicting access request in LARconf (lines 40-45). Once all possible weights and
access requests have been evaluated, Algorithm 10 processes the stored values in weight by
computing the average value for each component (see lines 48-49). These values are then
returned to Algorithm 11 to estimate class label of upcoming access requests.
Algorithm 10 is exploited by the P-PDS to initialize the personalized weights. This is
done when the P-PDS has to evaluate a new access request. Indeed, if the newly arrived
access request AR has not to be labeled by P-PDS owner, it is inserted into the UAR
set which is then evaluated by P-PDS using the updated classifiers (cfr. Algorithm 11).
This evaluation is done by Algorithm 11, which exploits the personalized semi-supervised
ensemble approach for those access requests in UAR having a conflicting decision (see lines
23-37); otherwise, it exploits traditional ensemble.
More precisely, the final prediction is then computed by combining each class probability
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PAR, predicted by each single classifier ΘensembleHBAL based on bagging method [37, 79].
4
The final class label is set as the one with maximum probability (see lines 39 - 42 in
Algorithm 11).
4Bagging is an effective method for ensemble learning, where the final label is assigned by computing
the average of membership probabilities returned by the obtained classifiers.
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Algorithm 10 Personalized weight ()
Input: LARconf ❸ LAR, the set of conflicting access requests in the training dataset
Output: weight, the vector storing the weights for each class
strength
1: Let W be the set of arrays in the Cartesian product
➅
9
k✏1Dk, where D ✏ "1, 2, 3, 4, 5✉
2: for each w $W do
3: for each AR✶ $ LARconf do
4: Let Cs be the set of label strengths returned by classifiers ΘensembleHBAL on AR
✶
5: Let OLAR✶ be the class label given by the PDS owner to AR
✶
6: Let CS be a vector of 9 elements initialized to 0
7: Let Acc, sumyes, sumno, summaybe be initialized to 0
8: for each x $ Cs do
9: switch (x)
10: case “strongyes”:
11: CS[1]=CS[1]+1
12: case “moderateyes”:
13: CS[2]=CS[2]+1
14: case “weakyes”:
15: CS[3]=CS[3]+1
16: case “strongno”:
17: CS[4]=CS[4]+1
18: case “moderateno”:
19: CS[5]=CS[5]+1
20: case “weakno”:
21: CS[6]=CS[6]+1
22: case “strongmaybe”:
23: CS[7]=CS[7]+1
24: case “moderatemaybe”:
25: CS[8]=CS[8]+1
26: default:
27: CS[9]=CS[9]+1
28: end switch
29: end for
30: sumyes ✏ sumyes % CS&1' ✝ w&1' % CS&2' ✝ w&2' % CS&3' ✝ w&3'
31: sumno ✏ sumno % CS&4' ✝ w&4' % CS&5' ✝ w&5' % CS&6' ✝ w&6'
32: summaybe ✏ summaybe % CS&7' ✝ w&7' % CS&8' ✝ w&8' % CS&9' ✝ w&9'
33: if ♣sumyes ➙ sumno+ ❫ ♣sumyes ➙ summaybe+ then
34: CLAR✶ ✏ yes
35: else if ♣sumno ➙ sumyes+ ❫ ♣sumno ➙ summaybe+ then
36: CLAR✶ ✏ no
37: else
38: CLAR✶ ✏ maybe
39: end if
40: acc ✏ accuracy♣CLAR✶ , OLAR✶+
41: if acc ➙ Acc then
42: weight ✏ w
43: Acc ✏ acc
44: end if
45: end for
46: end for
47: Let AvgWeight be a vector of 9 elements initialized as empty
48: for i $ "1, 2, ...9✉ do
49: AvgWeight&i'= 1
⑤weight⑤
✂
➦
❅w$weight
w&i'
50: end for
51: Return: AvgWeight
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Algorithm 11 Evaluate access request()
Input: UAR, the set of unlabeled access request;
Output: Labels for UAR
1: Let CS be a vector of ⑤ΘensembleHBAL ⑤ elements
2: Let PAR♣yes", PAR♣no", PAR♣maybe" be initialized to 0
3: Let i be initialized to zero
4: for each uar # UAR do
5: for θ # ΘensembleHBAL do
6: Let P θ
AR
♣yes" be the probability for AR of being labeled as yes, computed using θ
7: Let P θ
AR
♣no" be the probability for AR of being labeled as no, computed using θ
8: Let P θ
AR
♣maybe" be the probability for AR of being labeled as maybe, computed
using θ
9: if (P θ
AR
♣yes" ➙ P θ
AR
♣no"" ❫ ♣P θ
AR
♣yes" ➙ P θ
AR
♣maybe" ) then
10: CS&i' ✏ yes
11: else
12: if (P θ
AR
♣no" ➙ P θ
AR
♣yes"" ❫ ♣P θ
AR
♣no" ➙ P θ
AR
♣maybe") then
13: CS&i' ✏ no
14: else
15: CS&i' ✏ maybe
16: end if
17: end if
18: i ✏ i) 1
19: PAR♣Y es" = PAR♣Y es" ) P
θ
AR
♣Y es"
20: PAR♣No" = PAR♣No" ) P
θ
AR
♣No"
21: PAR♣Maybe"= PAR♣Maybe" ) P
θ
AR
♣Maybe"
22: end for
23: if (decisions are conflicting in CS) then
24: Let CS be a vector of 9 elements represents the class strengths on AR
25: Let w be a vector of 9 elements
26: w = Personalized weight algorithm()
27: sumyes ✏ CS&1' ✝ w&1' ) CS&2' ✝ w&2' ) CS&3' ✝ w&3'
28: sumno ✏ CS&4' ✝ w&4' ) CS&5' ✝ w&5' ) CS&6' ✝ w&6'
29: summaybe ✏ CS&7' ✝ w&7' ) CS&8' ✝ w&8' ) CS&9' ✝ w&9'
30: if ♣sumyes ➙ sumno" ❫ ♣sumyes ➙ summaybe" then
31: CLar✶ ✏ yes
32: else if ♣sumno ➙ sumyes" ❫ ♣sumno ➙ summaybe" then
33: CLar✶ ✏ no
34: else
35: CLar✶ ✏ maybe
36: end if
37: Return:CLar✶
38: else
39: PAR♣yes"= PAR♣Y es"④⑤ΘensembleHBAL ⑤
40: PAR♣no"= PAR♣No"④⑤ΘensembleHBAL ⑤
41: PAR♣maybe"= PAR♣Maybe"④⑤ΘensembleHBAL ⑤
42: Return: CD, and the label corresponding to max(PAR♣yes",PAR♣no",PAR♣maybe")
43: end if
44: end for
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5.5 Experiments
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed P-PDS, we conduct several experiments.
In the first experiment, we measure the accuracy level and F1 score obtained using the
semi-supervised ensemble (SSE) [85], semi-supervised active learning (SSAL), history-based
active learning (HBAL), and personalized history-based active learning (PHBAL).
In the next experiment, we analyse the access requests which are selected by SSE, SSAL
and HBAL to be labeled directly by the P-PDS owners. With this experiment, we want to
see which learning approach needs more training data to learn users’ privacy preferences.
Finally, we compute the satisfaction level of P-PDS owners regarding the decisions
taken by the various learning approaches. Moreover, we consider user quality in terms
of feedback on the training dataset to investigate how a badly labeled training dataset
impacts user satisfaction.
5.5.1 Settings
In this Chapter, we have created a dataset consisting of 303 access requests, by using
realistic values for data consumer, service type, requested data field, purpose and offer
value as did in Section 4.4.1. But here we have generated another dataset considering more
elements compared to 4.4.1. More precisely, we have considered 55 different data consumer
profiles; 18 different service types; 42 possible data fields; 21 purposes; and offer values
ranging from 0% to 100%. Based on these elements we randomly generate access requests.
To collect labels for the training dataset, as well as P-PDS owner feedback on access
request decisions, we designed a web application. To ensure the involvement of a good
number of participants, acting as P-PDS owners, we exploited a crowd-sourcing platform.
More precisely, we used the Microworker crowd-sourcing platform5 for the enrollment of
participants (called workers) of different nationalities, ages, and educational levels. At this
purpose, we selected only the workers with the best rating according to the Microworker
platform. Once the job has been accepted, each worker has been redirected to our web
application to conduct both the learning phase (aka, labeling the training dataset) and the
testing phase (aka evaluating the P-PDS decisions). As further quality check, we measured
the time each participant devoted to the learning task and, if this is less then a reasonable
time, we removed the participant. We obtained data from 360 workers.
In order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed learning approaches, we use the
same traditional confusion matrix given in Table 4.2 to define the evaluation metric as
shown in Table 4.3 to measure the effectiveness of the proposed approaches.
5.5.2 Results
Effectiveness
In this experiment, we show a comparative analysis of accuracy obtained by SSE, SSAL,
HBAL and PHBAL.
5https://www.microworkers.com
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Table 5.1: Comparison of SSE, SSAL, HBAL, and PHBAL approach for the training
dataset
SSE SSAL
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Precision 86.71 % 71.03% 51.74% 91.65% 66.64% 50.97%
Recall 79.84 % 74.51% 63.83% 83.45% 77.82% 65.83%
F1 83.13 % 72.73% 57.16% 87.36% 71.80% 57.45%
HBAL PHBAL
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Precision 91.10% 67.35% 52.06% 94.10% 71.22% 60.79%
Recall 82.10% 77.26% 69.67% 84.73% 81.93% 81.35%
F1 86.37% 71.97% 59.59% 89.17% 76.20% 69.58%
Table 5.2: Comparison of SSE, SSAL, HBAL, and PHBAL approach for the testing
dataset
SSE SSAL
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Precision 85.24% 74.09% 64.28% 89.48% 75.58% 58.88%
Recall 86.86% 76.89% 55.38% 90.29% 69.89% 64.29%
F1 86.04% 75.46% 59.50% 89.88% 72.63% 61.46%
HBAL PHBAL
Yes No Maybe Yes No Maybe
Precision 88.26% 74.86% 68.68% 90.43% 80.79% 58.58%
Recall 89.69% 77.01% 60.17% 90.75% 86.67% 51.32%
F1 88.97% 75.92% 64.15% 90.59% 83.63% 54.17%
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Figure 5.4: Accuracy of SSE, SSAL, HBAL, PHBAL
Accuracy. As a first experiment, we have run each learning approach on the training
dataset LAR generated by workers, to compute the true positive values (i.e., TPyes, TPno,
TPmaybe) and corresponding accuracy value (see Table 4.3). More precisely, we split the
360 participants into three groups: 120 participants have tested P-PDS with SSE learn-
ing approach; 120 with SSAL; and 120 with HBAL. As such, we obtain three training
datasets, namely LARSSE , LARSSAL, and LARHBAL, generated by participants using
P-PDS with SSE, SSAL, HBAL learning approach, respectively. Moreover, we have an
additional training dataset, denoted as LARPHBAL, consisting of those access requests in
LARHBAL that have been judged conflicting and thus have been treated according to the
personalize history-based active learning approach (see Section 5.4). In the experiment,
among the 120 access requests evaluated according the HBAL approach, 106 have been
judged as conflicting by the classifier.
Figure 5.4 shows that obtained accuracy. We can see that around 76.12% of the training
dataset is correctly labeled by SSE, around 80.65% by SSAL, 79.77% by HBAL, whereas
83.77% by PHBAL. We note that PHBAL and HBAL have a greater accuracy than SSE.
More precisely, Figure 5.4 depicts that PHBAL can improve the accuracy of SSE (e.g., the
proposal in [85]) of 7.65%.
However, we also notice that HBAL is little less accurate than SSAL. This is due to
the fact that HBAL further penalizes the uncertainty value of access requests based on
the values of service type and data consumer (see Section 5.3). Consequently, we expect
that, based on distribution of values of service type/data consumer, P-PDS owner will
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Figure 5.5: F1 score for training dataset
be asked to label a greater number of access requests compared to SSAL6 and that this
might have an impact on accuracy. To check how this impacts, we have looked on the false
negatives/false positives produced by HBAL and SSAL, respectively. The results show
that HBAL produces 3.47% false negatives and 7.14 % false positives, while SSAL has
3.27% and 7.16%, respectively.7 This highlights that SSAL and HBAL have almost the
same number of false positives, whereas HBAL errors are mainly increased due to false
negatives. This implies that HBAL is more conservative w.r.t. the preservation of users, in
that the majority of misclassification lead to the denial of authorized data release, rather
than to the release of unauthorized data. PHBAL exploits the access requests included
in LAR of HBAL as training dataset for predicting the class label of conflicting access
requests. Figure 5.4 shows that PHBAL improves the accuracy of HBAL of 3.00%.
F1 score. We have also measured the F1 score for each class (yes, no, maybe) for
comparing the performance among the learning approachers with respect to the training
dataset and testing dataset, separately (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). According to Table 4.3,
F1 score can be measured by considering both precision and recall. The precision is the
ratio of the number of correctly predicted items (i.e.,access requests) to the total number
of predicted (correctly and incorrectly) items. Whereas, recall is the ratio of the number
of correctly predicted items to the total number of relevant items. Our analysis shows in
Figure 5.5 for training and Figure 5.6 for testing dataset respectively. Results show that
6We refer to next experiment, aka Figure 5.7 depicting the training dataset distributions.
7To compute false negatives/positives, we have considered only the class labels yes and no, since class
label maybe represents users confusion to take decision on upcoming access requests.
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Figure 5.6: F1 score for testing dataset
PHBAL works comparatively better than other approaches. However, for testing dataset,
it produces good accuracy in case of class yes and no, whereas for the class label maybe,
its accuracy is lower than others approaches.
More specifically, PHBAL provides good precision and recall values for yes and no
decisions in-spite of having poor precision for maybe decision for testing dataset. It is
relevant to highlight that poor precision for maybe decision does not produce any threat to
privacy preferences as P-PDS asks PDS owner for his/her final decision regarding on the
maybe decisions.
Distribution of the training dataset
In this experiment, we observe the distribution of access requests selected by the P-PDS
for being labeled by owner so as to be included in the training dataset LAR. We refer to
this distribution as the training dataset distribution (TDD). The purpose is to compare
TDD when P-PDS adopts the semi-supervised ensemble (SSE) [85], semi-supervised active
learning (SSAL), and history-based active learning (HBAL) approaches. In this experi-
ment, we do not consider personalized history-based active learning (PHBAL) approach
because its training dataset is the same of HBAL. As described in previous experiment,
we split the 360 participants into three groups: 120 participants have tested P-PDS with
SSE learning approach; 120 with SSAL; and 120 with HBAL. For generating the TDD
graph of different learning approaches, we analyze the stream of arriving access requests
by grouping them in bunch of 5 access requests each (e.g., [1-5],[6-10],[11-15], etc.). Then,
for each learning approach (i.e., SSE, SSAL, HBAL), as a first statistic, we have checked
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Figure 5.7: Training dataset distribution for SSE, HBAL, and SSAL
the number of users that have been asked to label at least an access request in each group.
Figure 5.7 reports these results, where the X-axis shows the sequence of access requests’
groups and the Y-axis the percentage of users that have been asked to label at least an
access request (e.g., according SSAL approach, 20% of users have labeled at least a request
in the access requests group [56-60]).
Regarding TDD of SSE method, we have to recall that this approach selects a fixed
number of access requests as training dataset. In our experiments, we set this number,
denoted as NSSE , to 40, as shown in Figure 5.7. Regarding SSAL, this approach first
builds a preliminary learning model based on a small number of access requests, which is
typically smaller than NSSE . Then, the obtained preliminary model is used to select the
new access requests to be labeled by the P-PDS owner (i.e., to be inserted into LAR) based
on their uncertainty values. In our experiments, we set this small number, denoted asNSAL,
to 9. As such, as reported in Figure 5.7, the P-PDS exploiting the SSAL approach selects
the first 9 access requests for the training dataset. Then, from the 10th access request on,
the P-PDS exploits the preliminary model and, as depicted in Figure 5.7, the percentage
of owners that have to label at least an access requests decreases, and, as a consequence,
the number of access requests the P-PDS is able to automatically label increases. As an
example, from Figure 5.7, we can notice that in the frame [36-40], SSAL is able to make a
decision for 10% of users, reaching the about 50% in the frame [46-50], whereas following
the SSE approach users are forced to label all access requests in [1-40].
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Figure 5.8: Training dataset distribution for SSE, HBAL, and SSAL
Regarding HBAL, we have to recall that this follows the AL approach, but modified
so as to increase the uncertainty value based on the value of data consumer and service
type of the newly arrived access requests (see Section 5.3).8 As such, we expect that the
TDD of HBAL: (1) shows the same benefit of the SSAL approach, in terms of reduced
percentage of owners labeling access requests; (2) depends on the distribution of values of
data consumer/service types, since uncertainty penalization does.
Figure 5.7 confirms these expectations. Indeed, as depicted in the figure, HBAL is able
to automatically label access requests before the SSE but after the SSAL approach (e.g.,
HBAL is able to make a decision for about 10% of users in the frame [46-50], whereas SSE
only after the 40th access request and SSAL in [36-40]). Moreover, TDD of HBAL shows
different peaks (e.g., [66-70],[76-80], etc) as consequence of distribution of values of data
consumer/service types (e.g., access requests in frame [66-70] contain data consumer/ser-
vice types never labeled before). However, despite these peaks, Figure 5.7 shows that the
number of access requests to be labeled by the P-PDS owner decreases.
In addition to the above-described statistics on the percentage of users that have labeled
at least an access request in group, we have also analyzed the total number of access requests
that each approach requires to be labeled by P-PDS owner. More precisely, considering
that each learning approach has been tested by 120 participants, in each group we collect
a total number of 600 access requests (e.g., 120 5). Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of
access requests that on the total of 600 access requests have been labeled by owners. This
8In the experiments, we build the preliminary learning model of HBAL using the same number of labeled
access request we used for SSAL, i.e., NHBAL 9.
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Figure 5.9: Evaluators satisfaction level
result further confirms the benefit of HBAL w.r.t. SSE, that is, the HBAL’s capability to
automatically label new access requests before reaching the fixed number of labeled access
requests imposed by SSE, i.e., NSSE 40. Moreover, we can notice that even if HBAL
implies a penalization on the uncertainty values, HBAL and SSAL presents similar trends,
where the extra labels that, compared to SSAL, HBAL requires to owners brings benefits
in the obtained effectiveness (see experiments in Section 5.5.2).
Participant Evaluation
In this experiment, we collect feedback from P-PDS owners regarding the decisions taken
by the different learning approaches in order to evaluate their satisfaction.
Satisfaction level. For this purpose, we exploit the designed web application to
show to each participant a predefined set of access requests with the decisions returned
by the learning approaches, asking them to insert their own decisions. Then, to measure
the participant satisfaction level we compute the true positive values (i.e., TPyes, TPno,
TPmaybe). More precisely, the decision suggested by the learning approach is considered
as a true positive if it is the same as the one inserted by the participant. Thus, we define
satisfaction level as the ratio of the total number of true positives and the total number
of evaluated access requests. More precisely, we have shown to each participant 10 access
requests, where: 7 are new access requests, whose decisions have been generated by the
learning approach; the remaining 3 are taken from the set of access requests labeled by
that participant during the generation of the training dataset. These latter are used for
checking the consistency of participant judgments, and thus making some considerations
on the quality of their evaluation (see the discussion in the next section).
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Figure 5.10: Satisfaction level of consistent and inconsistent evaluators
As shown in Figure 5.9, around 79.17% participants are satisfied with decisions taken
by SSE, around 82.74% with SSAL, 83.10% with HBAL, and 84.64% are fine with the
decisions taken using PHBAL. This experiment shows that participants are less satisfied
by the performance of SSE than HBAL and PHBAL. Figure 5.7 reports the comparison.
Evaluator quality. The output of the machine learning approaches depend on P-PDS
owner’s input on the training dataset. Therefore, we are interested to investigate how a
badly labeled training set impacts the final satisfaction level. Thus, we set some strategies
to identify consistent and inconsistent evaluators. In this case, we follow two strategies:
the first one is recalled from Section 4.4.4, where 3 access requests are taken from the
set of access requests that evaluators have labeled during the first phase. In particular,
in presenting these access requests during the testing phase, the web application shows,
as taken decision, the same label entered by the evaluator during the first phase. Based
on the satisfaction level the evaluator assigns to this label, we can judge whether the
evaluator is consistent or not in his/her decisions, which gives us a measure of the quality
of his/her jobs. Second, we have inserted 2 access requests in the first phase (e.g., among
the first nine access requests) which contain inconsistent requested data fields with respect
to the purpose and service. For example, we ask a label for an access request these data
{traveling date, traveling time, From (starting place), To (destination place), etc.,}, having
a service purpose issuing a loan. We expect that, in case of an inconsistent access request,
a participant that carefully reads the request gives a deny decision/label. Based on these
two strategies, we consider a participant as consistent if he/she behaves correctly w.r.t.
the 3 access requests (i.e., (s)he is satisfied by the decisions shown by the web application,
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as they are the same (s)he has inserted during the generation of the training dataset) and
(s)he denies the 2 inconsistent access requests.
Figure 5.10 presents the comparative analysis of the satisfaction level for consistent and
inconsistent participants. The figure shows that the satisfaction level of consistent users is
greater than the satisfaction level of inconsistent users. However, even in the worst case,
about 70% of inconsistent evaluators are satisfied by the taken decisions.
5.6 Chapter summary
In this paper, we exploit active learning concepts to select the informativeness training
dataset to improve the performance of learning classifiers. In-spite of having this motiva-
tion, we do not simple use the active learning approach in our context but also we propose
a strategy to measure the uncertain access requests by considering elements (i.e., service
type and data consumer) besides the strategy of traditional active learning approach, since
we believe that for selecting most uncertain access requests as training dataset particu-
larly rely on the elements namely service type and data consumer. With this direction,
we impose more privacy restriction and improve performance of classifiers for predicting
decisions on upcoming access requests in P-PDS. Furthermore, we also exploit the obtained
classifiers decisions in term of measuring the strengths/weights by considering the accuracy
of the classifiers with respect to training dataset. More precisely, we measure the weights
vector for users privacy preferences based on the classifiers decisions which can be used
for taking decision regarding upcoming newly arrival access requests whether it might be
allowed to access P-PDS or not. With this way, we can minimize the false positive/false
negative cases which certainly imply to improve the performance of learning classifiers.
Chapter 6
Contextual based privacy
preference in PDS
6.1 Introduction
In the past few years, studies have shown that contextual information influences user’s
decision when sharing personal data with third parties [80,87,107]. Moreover, Nissenbaum’s
theory illustrates the reason for which most of the privacy preference models fail to protect
the privacy preference violations is that they do not consider contextual integrity [77]. To
date, several studies on PDS have suggested to enforce privacy preferences that regulate the
third parties access to PDS [6,35,84,101] without considering user contextual information.
However, literature shows that users prefer to set his/her privacy preferences taking
into account the contextual data [28, 73]. In fact, contextual information can be used to
design privacy preference framework that can define privacy preference according to the
user’s current situation. Thus, it can improve the overall usability and level of control on
personal data. Let us consider that a user may feel comfortable to take a decision, when
(s)he is in travel, regard on an access request seeking current location of the user in term of
suggesting some nearby famous places relevant to the user preferences for visiting. Thus,
it is required to develop privacy preference mechanism that can leverage contextual data
with non-contextual fields (e.g., access request elements) to learn user privacy preferences
efficiently.
In this chapter, we describe a contextual based privacy preference mechanism for PDS.
To figure out the latent correlations between the contextual data and user’s opinion on
the access request, we conduct experimental analysis on user privacy preference based on
users’ opinions on contextual based access request. With this intention, we exploit the
context information of the user and access request elements to train up the learning model
about user privacy preferences. Once the learning model has been built then it can predict
the decision automatically on the newly arrived contextual based access request according
to user contextual information. Moreover, in this paper, we also want to explore the
mechanism to reduce the over-fitting problem occurs in machine learning approaches. In
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Context={Day of week, Time of the day, Place, Activity}
Day of week {Workweek days, Weekend days}
Time of the day {Morning (6.00-11.59), Afternoon(12.00- 17.59), Evening(18.00- 23.59),
Night (0.00-5.59)}
Place {Home, Office/School, Outside}
Activity/Feelings {Meeting, Working, Running, Studying, Traveling, Eating, Sleeping,
Idle, Physical Exercise, Driving, Sick}
Table 6.1: Contextual data
general, over-fitting occurs when a learning model learns the noise/randomness along with
the samples in the training dataset that negatively impacts the performance of the learning
model on the upcoming new samples. To reduce over-fitting, the general approach is to
vary the number of training dataset sequentially and check the accuracy on the testing
dataset. The fact is that those combination of training dataset produce better accuracy
on testing dataset will be used for further predication. At this purpose, we proceed with
a approach: first we select the total number of training dataset according to the history
based active learning (see Chapter 5). After that we check which are the most uncertain
instances (having probability difference of the class labels are very close) in the total number
of training dataset and select the top 20 uncertain training dataset for a learning model
and check the accuracy on the testing dataset. By the same way, we then consider top 25
uncertain training dataset and check the accuracy on testing dataset. Like this way, we
proceed on and select the best model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the overall
architecture of our proposed context privacy-aware PDS (CP-PDS) framework, whereas
Section 6.3 illustrates the experimental results.
6.2 Context Privacy-aware PDS (CP-PDS)
The privacy preference framework presented in the Chapter 5 learns PDS owner’s privacy
preferences by exploiting only access request elements (e.g., data consumer, requested data,
service type etc.). As a matter of fact, this approach could not fully cover all aspects of
user concern in term of ensuring privacy on their personal data as it did not consider user
contextual information. Indeed, user might change his/her mind w.r.t privacy management
based on his/her present situation (e.g., contextual data) when the access request arrives
to PDS. For example, let suppose that PDS owner U receives an access request offering the
service entertainment during his/her office hours (e.g., office hours refer user’s contextual
information). In this case, U might always deny this access request. However, we believe
this might bring to a bias, as, it may happen that the classifier is trained based on situa-
tions where users deny access requests that, in different contexts, might be accepted, and
vice versa. As an example, let us consider an access request asking to obtain PDS data
for some entertainment services. If during the training phase, these type of access requests
come always during office hours, the PDS’s owner most likely will deny, resulting in the
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Figure 6.1: Context privacy-aware PDS (CP-PDS)
fact that the learning approach will train the classifier to always deny this type of services.
However, PDS’ owner might be willing to accept this type of services in other contexts,
aka during his/her free time. Thus, if we do not consider contextual information to train
up learning models then it will produce more prediction errors(e.g., false positives/false
negatives). To reduce prediction errors, in this paper, we consider contextual information
with access request elements to train up the learning models. The above example shows
that the contextual information of an access request might impact the users’ decision. Here,
contextual information is a broad term that can be more formally represented as a tuple
CTX of attributes, each one collecting a meaningful data to represent access request cir-
cumstances, like time of the request, current location of PDS’s owner, etc. The aim of this
work is to design a CP-PDS that, in presence of information about access request context,
is able promptly react so as to have a decision that takes into account also users’ pref-
erences w.r.t. the context. By considering contextual data with access request elements,
we can learn user privacy preferences by extending the framework presented in Chapter 5
with contextual data. More particularly, we can train the classifiers considering not only
the access request elements but also contextual information. Precisely, we can exploit the
ensemble approach as done in the Chapter 5 by having multiple classifiers built on access
request elements complemented with contextual data CTX.
Figure 6.1 presents overall architecture of CP-PDS. According to our assumption, user
contextual data combined with access request elements so as to get user opinions on up-
coming access request. To do so, as shown in Figure 6.1, we first ask PDS owner about
contextual based access request AR CTX for labeling (cfr. Figure 6.1.a). According to our
proposed learning model presented in Chapter 5, we exploit history-based active learning
for selecting the most uncertain access request AR CTX to be labeled by PDS owners,
so as to build classifiers with less number of good quality of labeled training dataset (See
labeling AR CTX part in Figure 6.1). Since we exploit the ensemble approach by con-
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sidering the contextual data with access request AR CTX, thus we consider the different
dimensions of access request elements with contextual data to train up multiple classifiers.
More particularly, let assume that we build a classifier by considering contextual data CTX
with (d0,DC), another classifier can be built with contextual data CTX and (d0,p). Like
this way we can build multiple classifiers as what we did in Chapter 4 for building ensemble
learning. The only extension in this chapter is that we consider contextual data with access
request elements. Once the classifiers are built then the PHBAL can predict the class label
on upcoming access requests (cfr. Figure 6.1.b).
6.3 Experiments
In this section, we illustrate the experiments we have performed to validate the proposed
approach. More precisely, Section 6.3.3 presents a comparison of the proposed approach
presented in Chapter 5 with the aim of assessing the importance of considering contextual
information with access request. More particularly, we conduct this experiment to show
the privacy preference accuracy of learning model when we consider non-contextual and
contextual based access request.
Section 6.3.4, we perform the experiment that shows the accuracy on testing dataset,
considering the contextual based access request. Moreover, in this experiment, we also
explore the mechanism to reduce the over-fitting problem occurs in machine learning ap-
proaches. In general, over-fitting occurs when a learning model learns the noise/randomness
along with the samples in the training dataset that negatively impacts the performance of
the learning model on the upcoming new samples. For reducing the over-fitting, we need to
do validation test with the learning models on training dataset with different approaches,
that is, sequential and least probability.
In Section 6.3.5, we illustrate the experiment that shows how much user’s decision are
impacted with contextual data. Finally, in Section 6.3.6, we present the results about the
accuracy on the testing dataset to check whether it will be increased or decreased based
user quality in terms of feedback on the training dataset.
6.3.1 Experimental settings
Datasets. We collected two datasets: one dataset, referred to in what follows as DS-1,
contains users’ feedback on both non-contextual and contextual access requests separately,
and another dataset, named DS-2, that contains users’ feedback on contextual access re-
quests only, as shown in Table 6.2. In DS-1, we only consider 20 users participation for
investigating on which type of access requests (e.g., non-contextual/contextual access re-
quests) users provide consistent feedbacks so as to check the performance of the learning
model. Afterward, we consider more users involvement in DS-2 to check the performance
of the learning model. We generate access requests containing realistic values for the data
consumer, service type, requested data, purpose and offer fields. Moreover, we also consider
contextual information, i.e., location, time, and activity. More precisely, we have consid-
ered: 55 different data consumer profiles; 18 different service types; 42 possible data fields;
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Figure 6.2: A sample of a contextual based access request to PDS
21 purposes; offer values ranging from 0% to 100%, and the following contextual data: 3
different locations (i.e., home, office, and outside), 7 days (e.g., Sunday, Monday. etc.), 4
time slots (i.e., morning, afternoon, evening, and night), and 13 different user’s activities
(e.g., meeting, driving, etc.). Based on these elements, we randomly generate access re-
quests (see Figure 6.2 for an example). Since, we use semi-supervised learning, we need
both labeled and unlabeled access requests. Each dataset contains 317 access requests. For
dataset DS-1 , we ask labels for 20 non-contextual access requests and 20 contextual access
requests, whereas for dataset DS-2, 60 access requests are labeled, whereas the remaining
ones are used as unlabeled data.
Evaluators. For access request labeling, we developed a web application, and we use
a crowdsourcing platform for user engagement. We have recruited 125 participants from
the Microworker crowdsourcing platform1 of different nationalities, ages, and educational
levels. For dataset DS-1, we recruit 25 users to label 20 non-contextual and 20 contextual
access requests. We exploit this dataset for checking the impact of contextual information
in access decisions (see Sections6.3.3, and 6.3.5). For dataset DS-2 we recruit 100 workers,
and we used it for the experiments in Sections 6.3.4, and 6.3.6.
To ensure good quality of the jobs submitted to Microworker, we have selected only
workers with the best rating according to the Microworker platform. As further quality
check, we measured the time each participant devoted to the labeling task and, if this is less
than a reasonable time, we remove the participant. For dataset DS-2, we have presented
1https://www.microworkers.com
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Table 6.2: Datasets used in the experiments
Dataset User’s opinions
on contextual
access requests
User’s opin-
ions on non-
contextual
access requests
# Labeled ac-
cess requests
# Users
DS-1 X X 20+20 25
DS-2 X 60 100
72 access requests to each participant. More particularly, 60 access requests have been
used as labeled training dataset; 7 access requests are used for testing the performance of
the proposed approach, whereas 5 access requests are used for checking the quality of the
job execution (see Section 6.3.6 for more details). The same approach has been applied to
dataset DS-1, except for the number of requested labels. More precisely, we have presented
52 access requests to each participant: 20 non-contextual access requests, 20 contextual
access requests, 7 access requests for testing purpose, whereas 5 access requests are used
for checking the quality of user feedbacks.
6.3.2 Evaluation metrics
In this chapter, since we consider classes with 3 labels (yes, no, maybe) user can give
opinion on contextual based access request, thus we exploit a 3X3 confusion matrix. More
particularly, in order to measure the effectiveness of the proposed approach, we use the
same traditional confusion matrix presented in Table 4.2 to define the evaluation metric,
accuracy as the ratio of total number of true positives (TPs) to total number of samples.
6.3.3 Non-contextual vs contextual based access requests
In this experiment, we compare the accuracy of the learning model when we consider con-
textual based access request and non-contextual based access request. In this experiment,
we exploit DS-1 dataset. Figure 6.3 shows the results on the testing dataset. Moreover,
the experiment shown in Figure 6.3 confirms that the learning approach produces good
accuracy on testing dataset when we consider contextual based access request than non-
contextual based access request. It implies that users feedbacks on contextual based access
requests are more consistent than on non-contextual based access requests.
6.3.4 Contextual based learning
In this experiment, we experiment our learning approach that exploit context and non-
contextual information together. As shown in Figure 6.4, the accuracy on the testing
dataset is around 75% produced by PHBAL. Moreover, since we use machine learning
approaches to learn user privacy preference decisions, thus we need to consider strategies
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Figure 6.3: Accuracy on testing dataset compared between non-contextual and contextual
based access requests
to minimize the prediction errors. As we know, machine learning has pitfall such as over-
fitting [25, 103]. To deal with this problem, we select samples by varying the size of the
training dataset, to check which one produces better accuracy on testing dataset. Prior
researches have defined different approaches to deal with this issue [5,57,90]. Therefore, we
experiment the following approaches, the first is the sequential based approach, which is a
traditional approach to reduce the over-fitting problem in machine learning [62, 90]. This
approach sequentially considers a set of labeled datasets of increasing size, and check the
accuracy on the testing dataset. However, we have also considered an alternative approach,
that we called least probability based approach. With this approach, we select the good
quality labeled training dataset for learning models. To do so, we select the labeled training
dataset which has least probability distance among classes from the labeled training pool
and increasing the size based on the probability distance, and check the accuracy on the
testing dataset. The experiment shows that least probability approach produces better
accuracy on testing dataset than the sequential approach.
6.3.5 Impact of context on users’ decisions
In this experiment, we investigate in how many access control decisions users have changed
due to the consideration of contextual information. The experimental result reported in
Figure 6.3 has already shown that a better accuracy is achieved when we consider contextual
based access requests. In this experiment, we want to show how many access control
decisions are driven by context data. For doing so, we first ask user opinions on non-
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Figure 6.4: Accuracy on testing dataset
contextual access requests and then we ask again the user feedback on the same access
request with the associated contextual information. Figure 6.5 shows the results. More
particularly, the experiment shows that 66.87% decisions are the same, but, interestingly,
33.13% of the access request decisions are changed by users when we consider contextual
information.
6.3.6 Participants quality
Clearly, the output of any machine learning approach depends on the quality of the user’s
input on the training dataset. Therefore, we are interested to investigate how a badly
labeled training dataset impacts the final decision on the testing dataset. Thus, we set
some strategies to identify consistent and inconsistent evaluators. First, three of the access
requests are presented twice to evaluators, to check if they are always marked with the
same label. Based on the assigned labels, we can judge whether the evaluator is consistent
or not in his/her decisions, which gives us a measure of the quality of his/her jobs. Second,
we have inserted two access requests in the first phase (e.g., among the first nine access
requests) which contain a requested data field which is inconsistent with the requested
access purpose and service. For example, we ask a label for an access request on these
data {traveling date, traveling time, From (starting place), To (destination place), etc.,},
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Figure 6.5: Users’ decisions changing rate based on contextual based access requests
having a service purpose issuing a loan. We expect that, in case of an inconsistent access
request, a participant that carefully reads the request will assign a deny label. Therefore, we
consider a participant as consistent if he/she behaves correctly w.r.t. the above described
checks. In our experiment, we show that 43% users have given feedback on access requests
in consistent manner, whereas 57% users are inconsistent.
Figure 6.6 presents the comparative analysis of the accuracy level for consistent and
inconsistent participants on the testing dataset for the learning approach PHBAL that
exploits the contextual data with access request elements for learning user privacy prefer-
ences. The figure shows that the accuracy achieved with consistent users is greater than
the one achieved from inconsistent users. It confirms that good quality labeled training
dataset can improve the performance of the learning model. The experiment also shows
that least probability approach produces better accuracy on testing dataset than the se-
quential approach.
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Figure 6.6: Accuracy on testing dataset for consistent and inconsistent users
6.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we simply extent the approach presented in Chapter 5 by considering
user contextual data. The experimental results show that the proposed privacy prefer-
ence framework produces better result when we consider user contextual data in term of
getting user feedbacks on access requests. Moreover, machine learning has pitfall such
as over-fitting [25, 103]. In general, over-fitting occurs when a learning model learns the
noise/randomness along with the samples in the training dataset that negatively impacts
the performance of the learning model on the upcoming new samples. For reducing the
over-fitting, we do validation test with the learning models on training dataset with an
approach called least probability approach proposed in this chapter provides better result
than traditional sequential approach.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future work
Personal Data Storage (PDS) enables individuals to store their personal data into a unique
digital repository so as users can have full control on their data. In fact, PDS offers indi-
viduals the capability to keep their data into a unique logical repository, where they can
be connected and exploited by proper analytical tools, as well as shared with third parties
under the control of end users. However, several research has shown that average users
are not so skillful to define their privacy preferences properly. Therefore in this thesis, we
have addressed different privacy preference mechanisms for PDS so as to help user’s to
manage their privacy preferences in PDS. In Chapter 3, we has discussed a new approach
for the design of a privacy-aware Personal Data Store (PDS) based on risk-benefit assess-
ment. In this chapter, we proposed the architecture of PDS as well as a suite of strategies
to share personal data with data consumers. In Chapter 4, we have considered the is-
sue of learning privacy habits of PDS owners. This is a crucial aspect since it may help
in reducing the burden of privacy preference specification. We have considered different
learning approaches to test which one better performs in the considered scenario. Such
approaches allow us to focus on different aspects of the user access request decisions. We
have extensively tested our approaches by using evaluators enrolled from the university
environment, as well as through a crowd-sourcing platform. The achieved experimental re-
sults are promising. However, it is obvious that machine learning approaches exploit user’s
feedbacks to train up the learning models for predicting user’s opinions on the upcoming
instances. Thus, good quality training dataset can improve the performance of the learning
models. Therefore, in Chapter 5 we have proposed a Privacy-aware Personal Data Stor-
age, able to automatically take privacy-aware decisions on third parties access requests in
accordance with user preferences based on semi-supervised and active learning approaches.
Moreover, the system relies on active learning complemented with strategies to strengthen
user privacy protection. As discussed in the chapter, we run several experiments on a
realistic dataset and exploiting a group of 360 evaluators. The obtained results show the
effectiveness of the proposed approach. In Chapter 6, we extent the approach presented in
Chapter 5 by considering user contextual data. The obtained results show that contextual
data play a essential role in term of implementing privacy preference models in PDS.
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We plan to extend our works along several directions. A first direction is the inves-
tigation of several functions to compute the risk and benefit values, taking into account
different dimensions of the data owners’ perspective in Chapter 3. Furthermore, we plan
to implement a prototype of our privacy-aware PDS and test it in different real world
scenarios. Then, we plan to extent the Chapter 4 to define a mechanism to exploit the
obtained classifiers for suggesting customized privacy preferences, that is, a set of rules
defined based on the PDS owner privacy aptitudes in access request evaluation. Moreover,
we plan to include strategies on support of privacy preference modification for misconfigu-
ration cases, based on the history of access requests made by service providers. This might
happen for those users who do not maintain consistency in terms of the given feedback
on access requests. Furthermore, we plan to conduct more user studies for understanding
how users interact with our framework and comparing it to alternative privacy settings
approaches. Next, we plan to extend the Chapter 5 along several directions. First, we are
interested to investigate how P-PDS could scale in the IoT scenario, where access requests
decision might depend also on contexts, not only on user preferences. Also, we would like
to integrate P-PDS with cloud computing services (e.g., storage and computing) so as to
design a more powerful P-PDS by, at the same time, protecting users’ privacy. Finally, our
future plan is to extent the Chapter 6 by proposing a solution that can define polices to
compute similarity aptitude of PDS owners so as to build privacy preferences models by
exploiting these similarity features.
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Publications
A.1 International Conferences
1. Bikash Chandra Singh, Barbara Carminati, and Elena Ferrari, “A Risk-Benefit
Driven Architecture for Personal Data Release” in IEEE International Conference
on Information Reuse and Integration, 2016.
Abstract: Personal data storages (PDSs) give individuals the ability to store their
personal data in a data unified repository and control release of their data to data
consumers. Being able to gather personal data from different data sources (e.g.,
banks, hospitals), PDSs will play strategic role in individual privacy management.
As such, PDS demands for new privacy models for protecting personal data. In this
paper, we propose a new technical approach that empowers individuals to better
control data in PDS. Particularly, we present a privacy-aware PDS architecture by
focusing on two logical data zones based on the categories of personal data. Moreover,
we propose a strategy for regulating personal data release that takes in consideration
both user preferences and possible risks and benefits of the data release.
2. Bikash Chandra Singh, Barbara Carminati, and Elena Ferrari, “Learning privacy
habits of PDS owners” in IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems (ICDCS), 2017.
Abstract: The concept of Personal Data Storage (PDS) has recently emerged as an
alternative and innovative way of managing personal data w.r.t. the service-centric
one commonly used today. The PDS offers a unique logical repository, allowing
individuals to collect, store, and give access to their data to third parties. The
research on PDS has so far mainly focused on the enforcement mechanisms, that is,
on how user privacy preferences can be enforced. In contrast, the fundamental issue
of preference specification has been so far not deeply investigated. In this paper, we
do a step in this direction by proposing different learning algorithms that allow a
fine-grained learning of the privacy aptitudes of PDS owners. The learned models
are then used to answer third party access requests. The extensive experiments we
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have performed show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
A.2 International Journals
1. Bikash Chandra Singh, Barbara Carminati, and Elena Ferrari, “Privacy-aware Per-
sonal Data Storage (P-PDS): Protecting User Privacy from External Applications”,
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC).
Abstract: Recently, Personal Data Storage (PDS) has inaugurated a substantial
change to the way people can store and control their personal data, by moving from
a service-centric to a user-centric model. PDS offers individuals the capability to
keep their data into a unique logical repository, that can be connected and exploited
by proper analytical tools, or shared with third parties under the control of end
users. Up to now, most of the research on PDS has focused on how to enforce user
privacy preferences and how to secure data when stored into the PDS. In contrast,
in this paper we aim at designing a Privacy-aware Personal Data Storage (P-PDS),
that is, a PDS able to automatically take privacy-aware decisions on third parties
access requests in accordance with user preferences. The proposed P-PDS is based
on preliminary results presented in [85], where it has been demonstrated that semi-
supervised learning can be successfully exploited to make a PDS able to automatically
decide whether an access request has to be authorized or not. In this paper, we have
deeply revised the learning process so as to have a more usable P-PDS, in terms of
reduced effort for the training phase, as well as a more conservative approach w.r.t.
users’ privacy, when handling conflicting access requests. We run several experiments
on a realistic dataset and exploiting a group of 360 evaluators. The obtained results
show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
